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Developing countries, such as Namibia, need to bridge the existing infrastructure gap to 
improve the country’s comparative advantage, economic growth and competitiveness, quality 
of life and the welfare of its citizens. As traditional sources of finance dwindle, Pension Fund 
savings need to be pooled to complement traditional sources of funding, such as government 
budgetary allocations, borrowing and user fees. Although infrastructure’s economic and 
financial characteristics are a match to Pension Fund liabilities, Namibia’s Pension Fund 
investment in infrastructure lags behind world-class benchmarks. This study investigated the 
factors that hinder Pension Fund investment in infrastructure in Namibia. The study employed 
a mixed-method research method and convergent parallel data collection processes. The study 
obtained a representative sample to participate in the survey from a population of NAMFISA 
registered Pension Fund and investment managers using a combination of the stratified random 
and simple random sampling techniques as part of primary data collection.  
 
The financial characteristics that make infrastructure assets attractive such as; long term, low 
sensitivity to economic swings, a low correlation with other assets and long term and inflation 
hedged returns makes them suitable for Pension Fund investments. The study confirms findings 
of previous studies by Beeferman, (2008); Ehlers, (2014); Inderst & Della Croce, (2013); Sy, 
(2017) and Thierie & Moor (2016), amongst others, revealed factors such as; a lack of a project 
pipeline, a lack of expertise by Pension Funds in infrastructure investments, Pension Fund 
regulation and a lack of financial instruments and assets that match Pension Funds are barriers 
to Pension Fund investment in infrastructure. The lack of a project pipeline is further 
attributable to issues such as infrastructure projects that are not sufficiently developed or viable 
on their own without some form of government support, inefficiencies in public procurement 
and public-private partnership policies and a lack of project preparation funding.  
 
The study recommends the following initiatives by policymakers and key stakeholders towards 
increasing Pension Fund investment in infrastructure: firstly, government and state-owned 
institutions responsible for public services should implement policies that will increase the 
pipeline of bankable and implementable projects. The National Development Plans (NDP5), 
the Harambee Prosperity plans and the Vision 2030 already identify projects; however, 
institutions tasked with infrastructure development need to develop implementation models that 
are viable and bankable. The development plans need to be coordinated across the various levels 
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of government and state-owned enterprises for effective implementation. Secondly, it is 
recommended that policymakers create the necessary conditions for Public Procurement and 
Public Private Partnership Policies to gain confidence amongst investors. Rooting out 
corruption and ensuring processes are transparent and fair to all stakeholders can have the effect 
of creating investor confidence in the two policies. The financial institutions, especially with a 
developmental angle, should support the public institutions with project preparation funding 
and technical assistance during project planning/development. Thirdly, the government, 
through the regulators, NAMFISA, are advised to continue with the implementation of policies 
aimed at increasing the limit on assets held with unlisted investment managers to allow 
increased Pension Fund investment in infrastructure without compromising the performance 
(return) and risk exposure. The financial regulators, NAMFISA and the Bank of Namibia 
should encourage the growth of the local financial sector to increase the quality and quantity of 
financial instruments available to investors and increase the depth of the financial sector to 
absorb local funding capacity. Lastly, the government is recommended to explore the options 
of partial listing infrastructure SOEs, such as NamPower, NamWater, Road Fund Administrator 
(RFA), NamPort, TransNamib, among others, to facilitate Pension Fund investment into 
infrastructure and reduce transaction cost and risks. 
  
The study identifies the need for future research opportunities with the aim of understanding 
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CHAPTER 1: Introduction 
1.1 Background 
 
Infrastructure plays a key role in driving a country’s comparative advantage, economic growth 
and competitiveness, quality of life and the welfare of its citizens (Yeaple and Golub, 2002). 
Della Croce, Schieb, and Stevens (2011) argue in their survey on Pension Fund investments 
that economic infrastructure drives competitiveness and supports economic growth through 
increased private and public sector productivity, reduces the cost of doing business, diversifies 
the industrial base and creates jobs. The expansion and modernisation of physical infrastructure 
in sectors, such as energy, water, transport and logistics and information and communication 
technology, facilitates rapid industrialisation, economic progression and social transformation 
that form a vital part of Namibia’s Vision 2030 goals to develop the country into an 
industrialised nation by 2030. Namibia aims to achieve Vision 2030 through policy tools, such 
as the National Development Plan (NDP), currently in its fifth iteration. Infrastructure 
development is essential to support developmental goals and to remedy the inherent 
infrastructure deficit that prevails as a developing country. Ageing colonial-era infrastructure 
and the need for additional infrastructure to facilitate economic and social development are the 
main drivers for the prevailing infrastructure deficit.  
 
Arezki and Sy (2016) argue that Africa’s developing countries need to reduce infrastructure 
deficits to achieve structural transformation and market integration across the African 
continent. Namibia’s standard gauge system railway network is underutilised mainly due to 
inefficiencies and its current state of disrepair. The road network thus carries a 
disproportionately high percentage of freight which increases wear and tear. Road freight 
accounted for up to 80% of the total tonne-kilometres of goods transported in Namibia 
including transit cargo in 2018 (Namibia-German Centre for Logistics, 2018).  In the Namibian 
context, infrastructure development is essential in improving prevailing social and economic 
conditions. Access to affordable electricity for urban and rural households currently stands at 
66% and 18.7% respectively (Namibia Statistics Agency, 2016). Access to clean and affordable 
energy is as an enabler to economic development, especially amongst rural communities.  
 
The fact that Namibia imports approximately 60-70% (Namibia Power Corporation, 2018) of 
electricity from neighbouring countries, due to the lack of locally installed generating power 
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stations, validates the need for the development of energy infrastructure. Namibia is a nett 
importer of electricity which is a significant drain on the economy due to the sustained capital 
outflow to facilitate electricity imports. Similarly, a lack of access to water and sanitation 
amongst urban and rural households hampers efforts to eliminate water-borne diseases and 
improve health. The above highlight the need for infrastructure development. The NDP5 
estimated a funding requirement for the infrastructure of roughly N$ 73 billion (National 
Planning Commission, 2017c) with most funding earmarked for energy, road and railway 
infrastructure. Namakalu et al., (2014), as part of the Bank of Namibia infrastructure 
symposium held in 2014, projected a significantly higher funding requirement at N$ 223 billion 
for transport, water, energy, ICT and housing infrastructure, with rail, housing and port 
infrastructure requiring the highest funding. Namakalu et al. (2014) base the funding estimates 
on NDP4 which is the predecessor to the NDP5. 
 
The main source of finance for infrastructure development under the NDP4 and, by extension  
NDP5, comes from fiscal budgets, corporate borrowings and government subsidies as outlined 
in Table 1 (Namakalu et al.,2014). The funding gap is projected at N$ 150 billion based on the 
requirement of N$ 223 billion and available funding of N$ 73.5 billion, as stated in Table 1. 
Based on the terminal review of the NDP4 (National Planning Commission, 2017b), the 
progress with implementation of infrastructure initiatives have not all been satisfactory which 
resulted in initiatives rolling over into NDP5. It can, therefore, be concluded that there is slow 
progress with the implementation of NDP infrastructure initiatives. The lack of progress of the 
implementation of NDP5 plans can be attributed to a shortage of funding from the traditional 
sources of funding, such as budgetary allocations, user fees and borrowings.  A classic example 
of the slow implementation of infrastructure initiatives in the energy sector is the target for 
NDP4 to achieve a locally installed capacity of 750 MW by 2018. This objective now forms 
part of NDP5, and the target has been increased marginally to 755 MW which must be achieved 
by 2023.   
Table 1: NDP4 Funding Plan 
N$ millions 2014/15 2015/16 2016/17 2017/18 - 2019/20 Total 
User Fees 3 446,30 5 964,60 6 279,70 10 426,60 26 117,20 
Government Subsidy  1 999,00 4 523,40 3 598,90 4 787,80 14 909,10 
Borrowing 2 176,60 6 723,80 8 639,40 14 965,20 32 505,00 




1.2 Problem Statement 
 
The infrastructure funding deficit can be eliminated or reduced by crowding in institutional 
investors, such as Pension Funds, insurance companies and other multinational financial 
institutions, such as development financial institutions (DFI), in the infrastructure investment 
landscape. Implementation of NDP5’s infrastructure master plan will improve Namibia’s goals 
of becoming a logistics hub and ensure the security of electricity supply to support economic 
growth. The electricity supply industry and logistics sector (port, railways and road 
infrastructure) make up about two-thirds of NDP5’s infrastructure budget plan (National 
Planning Commission, 2017c). Investment in the electricity sector will be used to increase 
power generation capacity, especially renewable energy technology, expansion of the 
transmission network and access to affordable electricity. The logistics sector will require 
investment in expanding the road infrastructure, especially the networks that link Namibia to 
neighbouring countries. Similarly, the railway network will need refurbishments and upgrades 
to a modern standard and extensions to northern neighbours, namely, Zambia, Zimbabwe and 
beyond. Transit to/from Zambia accounted for about 92% and 60% respectively of all container 
transit through Namibia, most of which is transported via road freight due to the absence of 
railways lines between Namibia and Zambia (Namibia-German Centre for Logistics, 2018) as 
illustrated in Figure 1. As shown in Figure 1, significant investment is required to link the 
Namibian railway network with the Angolan railway network and the Zambian railway 
networks. 
 
Figure 1: Current Railways Network in Southern Africa    










Funding for local infrastructure projects from internal resources will be beneficial for all 
stakeholders that include project developers, institutional investors, lenders, government and 
consumers of goods or services provided by these assets. Public sector investment in OECD 
(developed) countries, which normally sets the trend in terms of development, has been on a 
decline while the share of private sector investment has increased. Namibia is still a developing 
country and has so far been reliant on government budgetary allocations or borrowing to fund 
infrastructure projects. Therefore, in the context of limited fiscal space, the private sector 
investment will continue to grow and eventually overshadow the government’s investment in 
infrastructure development. Namibia’s development is expected to follow the same trend as 
industrialised OECD countries when it comes to private sector investment in infrastructure, and 
institutional investors, such as Pension Funds, have a major role to play in this sector.  
 
Given the vast funding requirements and ample financing capacity, institutional investors, such 
as Pension Funds, are a viable source of finance to bridge the prevailing infrastructure funding 
gap. A study by Bitsch, Buchner, & Kaserer (2010) on the characteristics of infrastructure 
investments found that infrastructure funds are a perfect match for Pension Funds because 
infrastructure’s return and cash flow profiles match Pension Funds’ long term liabilities. The 
Pension Fund industry accounts for about 55% of all the assets held by all Non-Banking 
Financial Institutions (NBFI). Pension Funds are fully cognisant of the risks of mismatch 
between their assets and liabilities hence the demand for stable income-oriented and inflation-
linked investments that result in a better asset/liabilities match.  
 
This research builds on preceding studies by Della Croce, (2012); Della Croce et al., (2011); 
Ehlers, (2014); Inderst, (2010); Inderst and Della Croce, (2013) who examined the challenges 
in infrastructure investment and experiences of Pension Funds in Australia and Canada.  
 
1.3 Research Questions  
 
Given the size of the Pension Funds industry, Namibia should not depend disproportionally on 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) for infrastructure development or government budgetary 
allocation. The country ought to repatriate a portion of investments in foreign-held assets to 
invest in local assets to foster local development and stimulate economic growth. Local sources 
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of financing will benefit the entire economy through the multiplier effect because money 
circulates in the local financial market/systems as opposed to being withdrawn as in the case of 
external funding. External funding will lead to net capital outflow because of interest and 
repayment of principal. The research question was broken down into the following sets of 
detailed questions: 
a) What factors deter increased investment by Pension Funds in local infrastructure? 
b) What significance do Pension Funds place on local infrastructure investments? 
c) What is the effect of Pension Fund regulation on infrastructure investment?   
 
1.4 Research Objectives 
The objectives of this research were as follows:  
a) To explore the challenges associated with infrastructure investments by Pension Funds in 
Namibia;   
b) To understand the priority and attitudes Pension Funds have towards infrastructure assets 
in Namibia; and 
c) To understand the impact of regulation on infrastructure investing.  
 
1.5 Justification of the study 
 
The fact that most of the Pension Fund assets are invested in various financial instruments 
outside of Namibia (as shown in Table 3), despite the high funding requirements shown in  
Table 1, proves that there is a need for a better understanding of the forces driving the lack of 
investment by the Pension Funds in infrastructure. Pension Fund investment in local assets has 
the potential to stimulate economic growth and development. The finding of this research will 
empower Pension Fund administrators (trustees, principal offices and fund managers), 
government agencies tasked with infrastructure development, the financial sector and the 
regulator about remedies that can be employed to address the challenges faced by the Pension 
Funds in infrastructure investing. Given the above context, the study is justified based on the 






1.6 Limitation of the Study  
 
The body of knowledge on the research subject is very wide due to the extensive research that 
has been conducted from various perspectives. The aim of this research was not to delve into 
issues that are specific to the Pension Fund industry, the infrastructure industry or the financing 
aspects. The research focus was limited to investigating convergent issues which contribute to 
underinvestment in infrastructure assets/projects by Pension Funds as shown in Figure 2. 
Additionally, the study tested theoretical frameworks developed in previous research in a 
Namibian context to reveal whether the challenges faced by Namibian Pension Funds have 
comparable underlying causes. The study acknowledges that the factor analysis was based on 
data that was not purely Likert scale as per standard practise and this may have a limitation on 
the findings especially on the relevance of the variable tested and impact on conclusions.   
 
Figure 2: Research focus and Limitations 
 
1.7 Structure of the Study  
 
This section provides a brief overview of the content of each chapter in this dissertation report. 
Chapter 1 discusses the background and the problem statement, which further builds up to the 
research questions and objectives. This chapter also covers the justification for the study, study 
limitation and the organisation of the study. Chapter 2 reviews the Pension Fund industry and 










on infrastructure as an asset class, the Pension Fund investment models in infrastructure and 
challenges encountered by the Pension Funds in financing infrastructure.  
 
Chapter 3 provides an overview of the research design and methodology followed in addressing 
the research questions and objectives. Furthermore, this chapter discusses the methodology 
employed during data collection and analysis and the research design that will ensure the 
credibility of research findings. Chapter 4 presents a summary of research findings based on 
the data collection and analytical framework discussed in the previous chapter, and finally, 
Chapter 5 discusses the conclusion and recommendations flowing from the research findings 
discussed in the previous chapter. This chapter also relates the research findings and conclusion 
to the theoretical frameworks discussed in the literature review and reviews the shortcomings 




CHAPTER 2: A literature review 
 
2.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter consists of five sections covering the following topics: (i) an overview of the 
Pension Fund industry in Namibia; (ii) a review of how infrastructure is developed and financed 
within the Namibian context; (iii) critical reviews of the empirical literature on infrastructure 
as an asset class, the characteristics of infrastructure as an asset class, the financial instruments 
that can be employed by institutional investors to gain access to infrastructure and associated 
risk-return profiles; (iv) a review of Pension Fund investment models in infrastructure and 
associated challenges; and (v) a summary of the chapter.    
 
2.2 Overview of the Pension Fund Industry in Namibia   
 
Pension Funds serve the purpose of providing income during retirement. Retirement age may 
vary from country to country but typically starts from the age of 60-65 years with an optional 
early retirement from the age of 55 years. Depending on country-specific legislation, employee 
and employer contribute a defined percentage of the employee’s salary monthly to the fund for 
investment and savings purposes. Pension Funds traditionally invest savings in liquid assets, 
such as listed equities, bonds or fixed-income instruments with a long investment horizon. 
Other illiquid investments, such as funds, private equity (unlisted and property), have 
increasingly become prominent in Pension Fund portfolios. Retirement income can either be in 
the form of a lump sum pay-out at retirement or an annuity paid out at regular intervals until a 
beneficiary’s death. Pension Fund annuity payments are sometimes referred to as 
“superannuation funds”. In the Namibian context, a Pension Fund typically pays out a third of 
the savings as a lump-sum and the rest as a monthly annuity. A provident fund, however, pays 
out the entire savings in a lump sum. Sixteen of the 135 registered Pension Funds are provident 
funds while the rest are pension (retirement) funds.   
 
Pension Funds are classified either as Defined Benefit (DB) or Defined Contribution (DC). 
Modern funds are mostly DC funds, while most of the older funds are DB funds. Under DB 
funds, employers guarantee the benefit that the employee will get upon retirement based on the 
employee’s salary before retirement. However, DB funds are being transformed into Defined 
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Contribution (DC) funds whereby an employee’s retirement benefit is determined based on 
their contributions and any returns earned during the contribution period. The risk for any 
shortfall in DC funds rests on the employee rather than on the employer. The liabilities of the 
DB funds are long term in nature as they must provide for retirement benefits until a member’s 
death. DC funds also have a long term investment horizon; however, they require more liquidity 
as they pay out a lump sum to members at retirement or when the employee exits the fund.  
Greater choice allows fund members to choose the risk level of their retirement savings and 
investments. Most funds do not, however, offer members’ greater choice as this increases the 
cost of administering the fund.  A few funds offer older members an option of investing in a 
portfolio consisting of low-risk assets, such as bonds, fixed interest and money markets. DB 
funds tend to invest in liquid assets/instruments, such as bonds, while DC funds, which cater 
mainly for younger workers, are increasingly likely to have a greater allocation of shares.  The 
inherent risk transfer from employer to the employee, due to conversion of Pension Funds from 
DB to DC, may lead to higher risk aversion and hence lower allocations to shares and illiquid 
assets.   
 
Figure 3 below shows the Pension Fund investment landscape. Trustees are elected by 
employees to administer the operations of the Pension Fund on behalf of the members and final 
beneficiaries. The trustees, in turn, appoint administrators, such as principal offices, internal or 
external administrators, advisors/consultants and auditors, who are responsible for the daily 
operations of the Pension Funds. The trustees, on recommendations from consultants and 
advisors, appoint fund/asset managers to manage all or a portion of the assets. Depending on 
the size of the Pension Fund, the administrative activities are either carried out internally or 
outsourced to an external Pension Fund administrator. Administrative activities include the 
collection of savings from employers, investing with approved fund managers as per investment 
policies and disinvesting and paying out Pension Fund benefits to beneficiaries. Asset managers 
construct asset portfolios based on a combination of asset manager investment plans or Pension 
Fund investment policies. The activities of all stakeholders (trustees, principal offices, Pension 
Funds, administrators and assets managers) are regulated by the Namibia Financial Institutions 
Supervisory Authority (NAMFISA) as provided for in the NAMFISA Act 3 of 2001. Due to 
the nature of their fiduciary duties, Pension Funds are heavily regulated, especially concerning 
their risk profiles and the treatment of assets on their books. Pension Fund regulation limits 




Figure 3: Pension Fund Investment Landscape 
 
According to NAMFISA (2018), there are 135 active and seven (7) inactive funds registered 
with the supervisory authority. The Pension Fund industry is highly fragmented with one (1) 
fund, namely, the Government Institution Pension Fund (GIPF), which accounts for more than 
two-thirds of the assets under management by the Pension Fund industry. The top five Pension 
Funds in the industry hold 75.2% of the industries’ total investment holdings (NAMFISA, 
2019c). The Pension Funds vary in terms of membership, classification of a defined benefit or 
defined contribution, asset under management, the number of members and the average age of 
members. The biggest Pension Fund is the Government Institutions Pension Fund, which is a 
defined benefit fund with 102 254 active members as of 2018 and N$ 110 billion in assets under 
management. As a defined benefit fund, the government is ultimately the guarantor for the 
benefit pay-out.  GIPF pays out a lump sum to members at retirement and, after that, a monthly 
pension for life (Government Institution Pension Fund, 2019). GIPF considers the inability to 
meet future claim obligations as its biggest risk and thus keeps sufficient employer 
(government) reserves and continually engages with a participating employer, as a defined 
benefit fund, to ensure adequate contribution rates amongst other mitigating controls. As the 
biggest fund in term of member and asset under management, GIPF sets the trend in terms of 


























African Pension Funds are regarded as being in the “demographic sweet spot” (Sy, 2017) due 
to lower dependency ratios, increasing labour forces due to a mainly young population and the 
lower impact of the ageing population. Pension Fund assets have been on the increase while the 
liabilities are low and mainly long term (Bank of Namibia & Namfisa, 2018; Bank Of Namibia 
& NAMFISA, 2019; NAMFISA, 2019c). Pension Funds are a natural investor in infrastructure, 
given their match between the infrastructure’s long term, higher returns, stable and inflation 
hedged cash flows and the long term nature of Pension Fund liabilities.  
 
As of April 2019, the Namibian Pension Fund industry cumulatively held N$ 158.5 billion  
(Bank of Namibia & Namfisa, 2018; Bank Of Namibia & NAMFISA, 2019; NAMFISA, 
2019c) in assets under management with the majority held in overseas and local listed 
equity/shares. Pension Fund regulation currently requires that Pension Funds hold a minimum 
of 1.75% and a maximum of 3.5% of their assets in unlisted investments, most of which are in 
private equity/unlisted equities (Ministry of Finance, 2013). Pension Funds are largely 
compliant with Regulation 28 on assets held with Unlisted Investment Managers (UIMs) 
because compliance is measured against asset committed to UIMs and not actual drawdown. 
The actual drawdown/investment is significantly lower than the compliance limits, as shown in 
Table 2. 
Table 2: Allocation per asset class Q2 and Regulation 28 Limits   
Source (NAMFISA, 2019c) 
Asset class Q3 2018 Q4 2018 Regulation 28 limits 
Credit Balances 10.6% 11.1% 95% 
Government Bonds 12.0% 11.0% 95% 
SOE Bonds 0.8% 4.6% 30% 
Corporate Bonds 6.4% 1.7% 50% 
Foreign Bonds 8.6% 6.9% 50% 
Property 3.7% 3.9% 25% 
Shares 55.7% 56.6% 75% 
Other Claims 1.1% 0.9% 25% 
Other Assets 0.3% 2.5% 2.5% 
Unlisted Investment 0.7% 0.7% Min 1,75% Max 3,5% 
 
 A few UIMs invest in property and infrastructure, as shown in  
Table 5. The Namibia Stock Exchange (2019) reported that outstanding bonds due from state-
owned enterprises (SOEs), as of 5 July 2019, stood at N$ 1,741 billion of which only N$ 950 
million is to SOEs with infrastructure exposure, namely, NamWater and NamPower. The 
approved bonds programme is N$ 6.5 billion, of which N$ 4 billion is for infrastructure SOEs 
(NamWater and NamPower). The drawdown on the approved bond program stood at slightly 
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over 25% of the approved bond program which hints at issues with affordability and 
competitiveness of interest rates/bond yields.  
 
Namibia has recently increased the local asset requirement from 35% to 42.5% of total Pension 
Fund assets by September 2018.  Table 2 shows that compliance with this requirement has 
varied since the increase in local asset requirement and the industry has not been compliant 
mainly due to the fluctuation in exchange rates between the South African Rand and major 
reserve currencies, such as the US dollar. Assets that are repatriated from foreign investments 
are invested in traditional asset classes, such as fixed-interest (bonds) and the money market. 
Thus, the regulatory requirement did not drive investments into alternative assets and 
instruments, such as infrastructure and unlisted investments. Based on the statistics in Table 2 
and  
Table 5 and the limited pool of shares/equities with infrastructure exposure on the Namibia 
Stock Exchange, it can be inferred that Pension Fund investment into infrastructure assets, 
especially local assets, is limited and below the international benchmark of 10-15% of assets.  
 
Table 3: Pension Fund Asset held in each region 
 Q4 2017 Q1 2018 Q2 2018 Q3 2018 Q4 2018 
Namibia 42% 45% 40% 40% 42% 
Common Monetary Area ( CMA) 27% 25% 27% 26% 27% 
Africa (excl CMA) 4% 5% 5% 5% 3% 
International  26% 25% 28% 29% 28% 
 
Similarly, NAMFISA regulates the Non-Bank Financial Institution (NBFI) which acts as an 
asset manager for most, if not all, Pension Funds in Namibia. There are 25 Investment Managers 
and 23 Unlisted Investment Managers (UIMS) registered with NAMFISA as shown in Table 
28 and Table 29 in Appendix B. The industry is dominated by a handful of Investment 
Managers who manage about 67% of all investments. Foreign-based Investment Managers 
manage a significant portion of Pension Fund assets. Given the high likelihood that a Pension 
Fund does not have expertise nor experience in infrastructure investment, the Investment 
Manager plays a significant role in exposing a Pension Fund to infrastructure assets and 






2.3 Infrastructure Development and Financing in Namibia 
 
As outlined in Table 4, infrastructure development in Namibia is the primary responsibility of 
various levels of government (central, regional and local) and State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) 
that are responsible for the provision of public (merit) goods and services (National Planning 
Commission, 2017c). Table 4 shows the list of entities tasked with the provision of public goods 
and services in Namibia. The private sector is increasingly being crowded-in to the 
infrastructure landscape by the public sector and government, especially in the power sector 
where the Independent Power Producers (IPPs) are becoming prominent. The increase in 
private sector participation in power generation is partly due to the lack of government funding 
and guarantees for strategic projects, such as the Kudu Gas-to-Power Project and Baynes 
Hydroelectric Power Project. The government needs to prioritise its limited resources for needs, 
such as healthcare and education, where alternative financing may not be feasible or affordable. 
 
Table 4: Public Entities Responsible For Infrastructure Development 
Public Goods and Services Institutions 
Public roads and bridges Road authority 
Electrical infrastructure  (generation, 
transmission, distribution and supply) 
NamPower/Municipalities/Regional Electricity 
Distributors 
Port facility Namibia Ports 
Telecommunication Namibia Postal and Telecommunication Holdings 
(Telecom) 
Water and Sanitation NamWater/Municipalities 
Housing Namibia Housing Enterprises 
Railways TransNamib 
Airports/Aviation Namibia Airports Company 
Fuels NamCor 
Public health Government and private sector 
Education   Government and private sector 
 
Table 1 shows the funding plan for the NDP4, with a forecasted funding shortfall of N$ 150 
billion based on the funding requirement of N$ 223 billion (Namakalu et al., 2014). The funding 
shortfall demonstrates the need for alternative models of infrastructure development and 
financing. An alternative source of finance may include a listing of equities and bonds on the 
stock exchanges, such as the Namibia Stock Exchange (NSX), or the much larger Johannesburg 
Stock Exchange (JSE). SOEs, such as NamPower, NamWater Telecom and the Road Fund 
Administration, have previously listed bonds on the NSX and JSE. The instruments detailed in 
Figure 7 are viable vehicles for institutional investors, such as Pension Funds, insurance 
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companies and fund managers, to channel their investments to infrastructure projects and 
companies to alleviate the funding shortfalls. 
 
Regulation 28 on unlisted investments encourages Pension Funds to invest in the domestic 
market to ensure that Namibian savings are utilised to stimulate local development. As shown 
in  
Table 5, the number of unlisted fund managers and available funding capacity for infrastructure 
(non-property) is limited, furthermore, the maximum investment by Pension Funds is limited 
to 3.5% of funds under management which represents a ceiling of N$ 5.5 billion for the entire 
industry based on the total Pension Fund assets of N$ 158.5 billion (Bank Of Namibia & 
NAMFISA, 2019). In line with Regulation 28 of the Pension Fund Act, Pension Funds, such as 
GIPF, have invested in unlisted investment vehicles, as shown in  
Table 5 and Table 29, for various mandates inclusive of infrastructure. The Unlisted Investment 
Managers, via their Special Purpose Vehicles, manage about N$ 1.2 billion of GIPF’s assets in 
Unlisted Investments. According to the Government Institution Pension Fund (2019)’s 2018 
Annual report, none of the three (3) UIMs with mandates for infrastructure investment had 
utilised the assets allocated to them which points to the lack of a pipeline of bankable projects.  
 
As studied in section 2.5, international benchmarks set the percentage of Pension Fund assets 
in infrastructure at a 10% to 15% range. Alternative investment vehicles, such as listed funds, 
need to be investigated to allow Pension Funds more flexibility in investing in infrastructure 
















Table 5: Unlisted Investment Managers with GIPF Mandates  
Source: (Government Institutions Pension Funds, 2019) 
Number Unlisted Investment Manager Special Purpose Vehicle Mandates 
1  IJG Capital (Pty) Ltd IJG Frontier Investment 
Fund Ltd 
Private Equity and Venture Capital  
2 BFS NamPro Fund Manager (Pty) Ltd The Namibia 
Procurement Fund I and 
II 
Procurement Debt Fund  
3 EOS Capital (Pty) Ltd Allegrow Fund (Pty) Ltd Private Equity  
4 Mergence Investment Managers 
(Namibia) (Pty) Ltd 
Mergence Namibia 
Infrastructure Fund 
Infrastructure and Private 
Equity  
5 Koningstein Capital (Pty) Ltd Koningstein Capital 
Property Investment Fund  
Property Development and Private 
Equity  
6  Musa Capital Namibia (Pty) Ltd The Namibia Mid-Cap 
Fund 
Private Equity  
7 Ino Harrith Capital (Pty) Ltd Namibia Infrastructure 
Fund 
Infrastructure and Private 
Equity  
8 Old Mutual Alternative Investments 
(Namibia) (Pty) Ltd 
Tunga Real Estate Fund 
and Expanded 
Infrastructure Fund  
Property (Retail, Residential and 
affordable Housing) and 
Infrastructure services  
9 Baobab Capital (Pty) Ltd Baobab Growth Fund 
(Pty) Ltd 
Venture Capital  
10 Ariya Bridge Capital (Pty) Ltd Ariya Bridge Trust Fund Infrastructure and Private 
Equity  
11 Preferred Management Services  Preferred Investment 
Property Fund  
Property development  
12 VPB Namibia VPB Growth Fund  Private Equity and Venture Capital  
13 Safland Property Group Namibia Frontier Property Trust  Property, Focus on retail property, 
Offices and Industrial  
14 Kongalend Capital (Pty) Ltd  Kongalend Renewable 
Energy Trust 
SME Group Lending and Solar 
Energy Loans  
 
Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) are also an alternative approach to infrastructure 
development whereby the government or government-owned entities partner with the private 
sector to develop the infrastructure required for the provision of public goods and services. The 
Namibia PPP legislation advocates that PPPs must represent value for money by involving the 
provision of services to government and a substantial transfer of risk from the public to the 
private sector. The PPP Act No. 4 of 2017 was enacted but only came into effect in December 
2018, so the track record is rather limited. In a demonstration of the success of PPPs, the private 
sector is projected to have an installed capacity of approximately 245 MW of renewable (wind 
and solar PV) energy generation by the end of 2022. Namibia Power Corporation (NamPower) 
has been able to secure private sector investment by entering into Power Purchase Agreements 
(PPA) with private developers. Private-sector investments, facilitated through PPP projects, has 
freed up significant capital that NamPower can use for technology/infrastructure projects which 




The above characterisation of the infrastructure development industry shows the need for 
changes in infrastructure development and the use of alternative financial assets and 
instruments as discussed in section 2.4.3. 
 
2.4 The literature on Infrastructure as an asset class  
 
2.4.1 Definition of Infrastructure  
 
According to OECD glossary, infrastructure is generally defined as a system of public works 
which can include roads, utility lines and public buildings. Inderst (2010) defines infrastructure 
within an investment environment as covering the following:  
a) Transportation (airports, bridges, roads and ports etc.); 
b) Utilities (power generation and distribution networks, water and sewerage services); 
c) Communication networks; and 
d) Renewable energy such as solar, wind, geothermal and biomass etc. 
And social infrastructure, including:  
i.) Educational facilities; 
ii.) Healthcare facilities such as hospital and clinics; and  
iii.) Sports facilities.  
 
The above categorisation might seem clear cut, however, there are some overlaps due to the 
classification of companies that own or operate the infrastructure assets/projects, such as utility 
companies which have generation, transmission and distribution assets. Beeferman (2008) 
further splits the economic infrastructure into the transportation and utility sectors. Overlaps in 
definitions can arise in terms of categorising infrastructure as either public or private. In the 
utility industry, power generation assets can be privately owned; however, the services are 
provided for the public good or on behalf of the public sector. Is the definition of the “public” 
dependent on the ownership structure or the services that are being provided and to whom? 
 
2.4.2 Characteristics of infrastructure as an Asset Class 
 
Institutional investors have typically invested in infrastructure via listed companies or fixed 
income instruments (Della Croce, 2012). Investors have begun to recognise that infrastructure 
is a unique asset class despite its inherent heterogeneity. Infrastructure is distinct from property 
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or real estate assets. The investment industry prefers to categorise infrastructure in terms of the 
economic and financial characteristics as opposed to physical features (Inderst, 2010). An 
infrastructure asset should typically operate in the environment characterised by little 
competition, due to natural monopolies, government regulations or concessions. The degree of 
competition, however, might also be influenced by the maturity of markets/regulations in the 
country. For example, in the United Kingdom (UK), power market developers bid to construct 
and operate a merchant power plant that will sell power to any buyer on open market principles. 
The nature of the UK market means that there are no guarantees in terms of the offtake of the 
power from the power plant.  
 
The following may form part of the infrastructure’s economic characteristics:  
a)  High barriers to entry which can arise as a result of factors such as high capital 
investments and regulations; 
b) Economies of scale arising due to high fixed costs and low variable costs;  
c) Inelastic demand for goods and services which gives pricing power to infrastructure 
assets;  
d) Long durations associated with concessions which range from 25 to 99-year leases. 
The value proposition of infrastructure is to capture the financial characteristics discussed in 
the following sections:   
 
2.4.2.1 Attractive Returns 
 
Infrastructure asset return is only second to private equity returns (Morgan, 2007) but above 
stocks, bonds and cash. Furthermore, research by Deutsche Bank (2013) revealed that listed 
infrastructure returns outperform global equities. 
 
2.4.2.2 Low Sensitivity to Swings in Economy Growth and Financial Markets 
 
Newell, Peng, & de Francesco( 2011); Oyedele, (2014); Russ, D., Thambiah, Y., Foscari,( 
2010) as cited by Thierie & Moor (2016) confirm the finding that infrastructure returns are 
insensitive to economic cycles. This finding was further reaffirmed by Bitsch, Buchner, & 
Kaserer(2010) in empirical studies on private equity-type investments in unlisted infrastructure 
deals. Oyedele(2014) further claims that, despite the enhanced investment performance as a 
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result of including infrastructure in a mixed-asset portfolio, the main benefits are more in terms 
of risk reduction, diversification and return enhancements.   
   
Figure 4: Infrastructure Exposure to cash flow risk and economic cycle   
Source (Mark Roberts, Patel, & Minella, 2015) 
 
2.4.2.3 Low Correlation with Other Asset Classes  
 
Infrastructure returns have a low correlation with other asset classes which offers diversification 
potential to investors. Peng & Newell ( 2007) in the study to ascertain “the significance of 
infrastructure in an investment portfolio” found low correlation coefficients between 
infrastructure and equities and bonds. This is confirmed by Inderst and Della Croce (2013) and 
(Russ, D., Thambiah, Y., Foscari, 2010) as shown in Figure 5. Infrastructure assets are expected 
to have similar characteristics irrespective of whether they are in developed or developing 
countries; hence, infrastructure in developing countries is also expected to have a low 




Figure 5: Infrastructure correlation with other asset classes  
Source:  (Russ, D., Thambiah, Y., Foscari, 2010) 
 
2.4.2.4 Long Term, Stable and Predictable Cash Flows 
 
Bitsch, Buchner, & Kaserer(2010) evaluated risk, return and cash flow characteristics of 
infrastructure and non-infrastructure investments done by unlisted funds. The study covered 
about 363 infrastructure and 11,223 non-infrastructure deals. In this empirical study, Bitsch et 
al. (2010) found that infrastructure assets typically have a long term investment horizon; 
however, the study did not find strong evidence of stable cash flows relative to non-
infrastructure assets. Researchers argue that higher market risks cause higher infrastructure 
returns. In contrast, studies by Roberts & Durkin (2014) on behalf of Deutsche Bank, revealed 
that stable cash flows associated with unlisted infrastructure assets in European countries are 
partly attributed to regulations and inelasticity of demand. 
 
Furthermore, subsequent studies by Bitsch (2012), on cash flows of listed infrastructure 
companies and funds, found that they have more stable and predictable cash flows. The finding 
by Bitsch et al. (2010) seems to have been superseded by most recent research and is thus not 
homogenous across the asset class. The difference in findings can partly be attributed to the 
heterogeneity of the infrastructure asset class; different infrastructure assets exhibit widely 
varying cash flow characterises depending on the nature of the infrastructure involved.  
 
2.4.2.5 Good Inflation Hedge  
 
Infrastructure does not have any significant inflation linkage and thus offers no natural inflation 
hedge for investors. Empirical evidence on inflation linkage seems to contradict findings by 
Roedel and Rothballer (2011) which suggest that inflation can be passed on to the customers 
due to infrastructure assets’ quasi-monopolistic nature and the inelasticity of demands 
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associated with them. This apparent contradiction could be explained by the fact that 
infrastructure funds forming part of the study were structured as funds in the private equity 
industry. The cash flows between the portfolio company and the fund may, as a result, differ 
from those between funds and investors due to the fund’s fees and the number of projects 
included in the funds. Numerous academic reports note that cash flows are frequently linked to 
inflation through the regulatory framework and contractual arrangements (Thierie & Moor, 
2016). Renewable energy projects, developed under South Africa’s Renewable Energy 
Independent Power Producer Procurement Programme (REIPPPP), are typical examples of 
inflation hedge through the tariff indexation against inflation as part of the Power Purchase 
Agreement (PPA) (Eberhard, Kolker, & Leigland, 2014).  Several authors (Croce, 2011; Mart 
Roberts & Durkin, 2014; Russ, D., Thambiah, Y., Foscari, 2010) argue that, because of the 
monopolistic nature of the asset and inelasticity of demand, inflation can be easily passed on to 
consumers. Although most papers seem to back the inflation hedging capability on 
infrastructure assets, the associated coefficients are often statistically insignificant. It can thus 
be concluded that, even though the investment community is convinced of the inflation-hedging 
aspects of infrastructure assets, empirical evidence proving such a theoretical framework is 
limited. 
   
2.4.2.6 Low Default Rate  
 
Studies by Bitsch et al. (2010) discovered that infrastructure assets have low default rates 
despite offering significantly higher returns. This can be attributed to the monopolistic nature 
of the assets.  
 
Studies by various authors found that infrastructure is a diverse asset which may range from 
the purely economic to social infrastructure with similarly high heterogeneous financial 
characteristics. The heterogeneity of infrastructure’s financial characteristics may present 
challenges to the Pension Fund in so far as possessing the requisite expertise to make 
appropriate investment decisions. 
 
2.4.3  Financial instruments  
 
Institutional investors, such as Pension Funds, can participate in infrastructure finance in the 
form of either debt or equity finance as illustrated in Figure 6. The debt and equity finance can 
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be done either directly into the infrastructure project or indirectly via listed funds/bonds or listed 
shares of companies that operate infrastructure assets. Below is a detailed overview of each 
form of investment. The direct investment mechanism highlighted in Figure 6 offers many 
different financial characteristics compared to indirect methods, in most instances, to the benefit 
of the investors. Investment in listed equities and bonds in the Namibian market is limited, 
given the number of companies listed on the Namibian stock exchange (NSX). As of March 
2019, only one infrastructure company, Nimbus Infrastructure Limited (Namibia Stock 
Exchange, 2019) was listed.  A few bonds from infrastructure operators and developers, such 
as NamPower, NamWater and Road Authority, have been previously listed on NSX. 
NamPower currently has a ZAR 5 billion bond listed on the JSE of which ZAR 750 million has 
been drawn down.  Most, if not all, financing vehicles are available in Namibia, albeit on a 
limited scale relative to South Africa where the financial markets are highly developed.   
 
Figure 6: Infrastructure Financing Vehicles                   
Source: (Della Croce, 2012) 
 
2.4.3.1 Listed Equities  
 
Listed equities offer indirect exposure to infrastructure assets; however, the returns are not the 
same as in the case of direct investment.  Listed equities of infrastructure operators and 
infrastructure funds are less risky than direct investments and enable smaller Pension Fund 
investors to partake in infrastructure finance (Bitsch et al., 2010). Listed infrastructure assets 
forming part of a portfolio investment are attractive for their risk reduction role rather than 
return enhancements (J. B. Oyedele, Adair, & McGreal, 2014). A feature of listed infrastructure 
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assets makes it easier to diversify a portfolio and reduce exposure to country-specific risks such 
as political and regulatory risks.  
a) Listed Shares 
i) Infrastructure operators: Shares of utility companies that develop and operate 
infrastructure assets, such as power generation, transmission and distribution 
assets. They afford investors exposure to the underline asset, albeit not to the 
fullest extent. An investor looking at inflation hedged return can get exposure 
through infrastructure operators.  
ii) Exchange-traded funds of infrastructure operators: These are a diversified 
portfolio of infrastructure operators that offer the same advantage as shares in 
infrastructure operators  
b) Listed Infrastructure funds: Listed shares of funds that invest in infrastructure. The 
fund can either be homogenous or heterogeneous in terms of the sector in which it 
specialises. Listed or unlisted funds invest in more than one project.  
 
2.4.3.2 Unlisted Equities 
 
Unlisted equity is shares of companies that are not listed on any stock exchange. Unlisted 
equities investment can be in the form of direct or indirect investment into infrastructure assets 
depending on whether equity is invested directly into a project company or an unlisted fund as 
discussed below:  
a) Direct investments in projects through a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) typically 
involve a long time horizon and a significant capital requirement but are less liquid as 
compared to listed equities or infrastructure funds. The minimum capital requirement 
limits investment to this class to large Pension Funds or insurance companies (Bitsch 
et al., 2010). 
b) Indirect investment via infrastructure funds (private equity-type): These types of 
funds are also less risky and allow the participation of smaller investors as compared 






2.4.3.3 Debt Finance/Project Finance   
 
Debt finance is a feasible instrument for investors to finance infrastructure projects. As per 
Figure 6, debt finance can be done either through corporate bonds which are traded on the stock 
exchange (listed) or direct project financing. Infrastructure companies raise funds for 
investment in projects via listed or unlisted bonds. Direct borrowing by the project company 
offers the most direct investment/finance vehicle to the infrastructure project which is similar 
to the unlisted equities albeit with lower risk profiles. Listed bond financing allows the 
participation of smaller investors. The time horizon for infrastructure projects is typically 
between 25 and 99 years therefore funding has a long term tenure spanning 12 to 20 years. 
Liquidity of lending directly to SPV is, therefore, lower as compared to stock exchange-traded 
bonds.   
 
2.4.3.4 Preferred Investment Vehicle by Institutional Investors 
 
A survey conducted by Pregin in 2012, as cited by OECD (2014), shows the preferred 
investment vehicles amongst respondents from institutional investors as depicted in Figure 7. 
Unlisted funds, direct investment, co-investment and project finance are the most common 
investment vehicles amongst institutional investors. This observation could be attributed to the 
unique characteristics of each financial instrument discussed above as well as in section 2.4.4.  
 
 
Figure 7: Preferred Financial Instrument      
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2.4.4 Risk-Return Profiles  
 
Infrastructure is a diverse asset class with diverse risk-return profiles and characteristics, as 
shown in Figure 8. The diverse risk-return profiles provide options for diversification to 
investors as highlighted in the financial characteristics of infrastructure assets.  
 
 
Figure 8: Risk-Return spectrum    
Source: (Inderst, 2010; Russ, Thambiah, & Foscari, 2010)  
Greenfield infrastructures have a wider range of risk-return profiles however, on average, they 
have a higher risk rating and expected returns as compared to equities. Similarly, Brownfield 
infrastructures have a wider risk-return spectrum albeit at low risks and expected returns 
relative to equities. Greenfield, however, has higher expected risk and return as compared to 
fixed income. The wider risk-return profile is expected to match investors’ varying risk and 
return expectations. Risk-averse investors are bound to find assets that can provide returns that 
are commensurate with risk exposure. Similarly, risk-seeking investors will find an asset that 
yields high returns. Risk is thus an important factor that needs to be expanded within the context 




Table 6: Common forms of infrastructure investment     
Source: (Bitsch et al., 2010) 
 
The literature on infrastructure investment vehicles can be categorised into four classes (Bitsch 
et al., 2010). Välilä (2005) conducted empirical studies on direct unlisted investment vehicles 
such as Public-Private Partnerships (PPP) and Project Finance while Roedel & 
Rothballer(2011) and  Rothballer & Kaserer (2011) researched direct listed investments, such 
as infrastructure shares and bonds. The above studies found that, as compared to non-
infrastructure shares, the infrastructure asset class has a considerably lower systematic risk and 
higher firm-specific risk which is driven mainly by demand/market risks (Bitsch et al., 2010). 
Direct investment is, however, at the end of this spectrum with a long term investment horizon, 
high liquidity risk, high capital requirement and high regulatory and political risk. The next 
section covers available literature on infrastructure asset returns and risk profiles  
 
2.4.4.1 Returns Profiles 
2.4.4.1.1 Direct investments (PPP and project finance) 
 
The return from direct investment through public-private partnerships and a project finance 
basis have a relatively high return as compared to the unlisted infrastructure funds due to the 
fee structure involved with funds (for example, high-performance fees). Although direct 
investment is possible through consortiums, it can still be prohibitive to small investors who 
lack the scale to invest in large scale capital projects. This form of investing usually involves a 
high sunk cost due to the high cost of due diligence and project packaging/structuring. 
Infrastructure projects of this type are financed mostly through limited resource project finance 
whereby lenders and equities investors only have recourse to the project assets and cash flows. 


























2.4.4.1.2 Listed assets: Stocks and bonds  
Many studies show that the listed infrastructure companies outperform general companies 
(Inderst, 2010). Research by Sawant (2010) reveals the high correlation of infrastructure stocks 
with general stock market indices. The probability distribution of return for the listed stock has 
a negative skew (increased probability of negative returns) and high kurtosis (“fat tails” which 
represents a high proportion of outliers). Studies by (Bitsch et al., 2010) show that there is no 
evidence to conclude that infrastructure assets have more stable returns. Infrastructure bonds 
offer low volatility (risk) but also low returns as compared to general stock or infrastructure 
indices (Sawant, 2010a). Additionally, infrastructure project bonds show more stable cash 
flows compared to non-infrastructure investments (Bitsch et al., 2010; Inderst, 2010; Inderst & 
Della Croce, 2013).  
 
2.4.4.1.3 Listed Infrastructure funds/indexes 
Table 6 shows that listed infrastructure funds typically offer investors the lowest capital 
requirement and have a shorter time horizon and lower political and regulatory risk. Listed 
infrastructure funds are diversified hence their performance, relative to the equities/shares, have 
a lower probability of negative returns (skewedness in the probability distribution of return) 
and lower proportion of outliers (kurtosis, fat tails). Similarly, the returns on the funds 
outperform non-infrastructure funds (Bitsch et al., 2010; Rothballer & Kaserer, 2011). The 
potential disadvantage is that listed funds tend to have a relatively higher correlation to equities 
as compared to unlisted funds. 
 
2.4.4.1.4 Unlisted Infrastructure funds 
Unlisted Infrastructure funds are a form of direct investment where, instead of investing in one 
project, an investor buys into a portfolio of projects which can be homogeneous or 
heterogeneous. The risk profile of the unlisted fund differs significantly from direct investment 
due to diversification effects. The expected returns are slightly lower, due to the fee structure 
of the unlisted funds. Despite the high fee structure of unlisted investments, they still have 
higher returns as compared to listed infrastructure and other assets as shown in Table 7. Smaller 
investors can gain access to unlisted funds due to low capital requirements. Political and 
regulatory risks are lower while the investment term (time horizon) remains the same (high) 




Additionally, these funds can be either open funds with no time limit or closed-ended with a 
strict time limit to invest and divest from these assets. Hybrid funds have been created to address 
the short term nature of funds and can invest across the broad risk-return spectrum ( Beeferman, 
2008). Open-ended funds tend to have the same characteristics as the underlying assets. They 
also tend to have lower fees as compared to closed-ended funds. Unlisted funds have a lower 
correlation with other asset classes (Inderst & Della Croce, 2013) relative to listed equities and 
bonds.  
Table 7:  Unlisted infrastructure performance: June 2009.     
Source: (Newell et al., 2011) 
 
2.4.4.2 Risk Profiles  
 
Risk is generally defined as any uncertainty associated with outcomes which can manifest at 
different stages of infrastructure development. Risk is measured in terms of the volatility of 
returns or stock prices. This section discusses the major risk generally associated with an 
infrastructure project.  
 
The risk profile changes through the lifecycle of the asset but is highest during the 
developmental phase when the asset is being constructed, as per Figure 9. The risk, in this 
specific phase, is referred to as “construction risk” which concerns the likelihood of not 
achieving the desired quality of construction or not completing the project within specified 
timelines, cost and performance. The project cost is ultimately the main risk factor because any 
inadequate work will need to be rectified with further equity injections or increased borrowing. 
Institutional investors, such as Pension Funds, are highly averse to construction risks and are 
thus less likely to invest in Greenfield projects. See Figure 9: Project life cycle risks and asset 
value. Mitigation measures may include the transfer of risk to other parties through 
Engineering, Procurement and Construction (EPC) wrap type contracts. Due to the risk transfer, 
the EPC counterparty may charge a significant premium of up to ±30%.  
Asset class 1Y 3Y 5Y 10Y 
Unlisted infrastructure 0.05% 9.59% 12.56% 11.53% 
Listed infrastructure −32.04% −8.85% 2.60% 8.47% 
Global listed infrastructure −29.16% −0.52% 11.03% 9.04% 
Direct property −7.15% 7.06% 10.76% 10.86% 
A-REITs −42.11% −23.07% −8.64% 2.41% 
Stocks −22.15% −3.76% 6.67% 7.33% 





Figure 9: Project life cycle risks and asset value      
Source: (Inderst & Stewart, 2014) 
Operational and management risks are typically low especially for infrastructure based on 
proven and mature technology and also because the project has, by this stage, started to generate 
stable cash flows as shown by a decline in risk level and an increase in asset value (see Figure 
9). Institutional investors, such as Pension Funds, are likely to invest in the project during this 
phase due to the reduced risk level. Business risk (demand, supply factors) occurs during the 
operation phase of the asset and may arise as a result of the deficit in forecasted sales and 
revenues.  In the power generation sector, for instance, contractual arrangements through the 
Power Purchase agreement ensure that the power plant utilisation is aligned to the level required 
for viability. Some projects may require to take or pay commitments from off-takers to make 
the project viable. Cash flow must, therefore, be sufficient and stable to cover loan repayments 
to service the debt repayment. Leverage and interest rate risk concerns the asset/company 
capacity to repay the debt based on the projects’ cash flows.  
 
Institutional investors, such as Pension Funds, typically require liquid assets to meet their 
liabilities when they are due. Infrastructure assets may have low liquidity because infrastructure 
investment usually entails a long horizon of 25 to 99 years so it may be difficult for an early 
investor to divest as the market may not be ready or liquid enough. As shown in Table 6, 
liquidity risks are highest in unlisted direct investments in the form of debt or equity.  
 
Regulatory risk typically covers the entire asset’s lifecycle and concerns any regulation that 
may impact the project during construction and operation. Project developers typically require 
a sovereign guarantee against changes in laws to protect their investments. Political and taxation 
risks typically involve factors, such as expropriation or nationalisation, which could affect the 
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project during the concession period. The tax regime could also be changed with an adverse 
impact on project financial standing and projections (Beeferman, 2008). 
 
Greenfield projects, such as new roads, bridges and tunnels, are generally riskier due to the 
construction and political risks and the fact that revenue projections are based on historical 
experiences as the demand has not been established. Investments in Brownfield projects are 
less risky as the assets are mature and cash flows are proven (Beeferman, 2008). Reputation 
risk can arise as a result of failed projects or association with a counterparty that may be seen 
to be corrupt. An institutional investor would need to have a risk management policy and 
frameworks that adequately address the risks as part of the general investment activities in 
infrastructure or project specific risks.   
 
2.5 Pension Fund Investment Models into infrastructure Projects  
 
The researcher perceives Australian and Canadian Pension Funds as pioneers and leaders in the 
field of infrastructure investments since the early 1990s. Institutional investors, including 
Pension Funds, are attracted to infrastructure assets because of the promise of higher and more 
stable returns through diversifying their portfolios and finding a better match to the fund’s long-
term liabilities (Beeferman, 2008; Della Croce & Yermo, 2013). This section discussed the 
literature on Pension Fund investment in infrastructure and barriers to increased investments.  
 
2.5.1 Comparison between the Canadian and Australian model 
 
Australian and Canadian Pension Funds have by far the largest asset allocation (± 5%) globally 
(Croce, 2011). This section compares and contrasts the experiences of Australian and Canadian 
Pension Funds in infrastructure investment and the lessons that can be learnt by global Pension 
Funds, including those in Namibia, based on the research by Inderst and Della Croce (2013). 
The following are observations regarding the characteristics and experiences of Pension Funds’ 
investment in infrastructure in Australia and Canada: 
 
a) The development of infrastructure in both countries is the responsibility of both the state 
and the federal government. The different levels of government plan and coordinate 
investments for infrastructure development. Infrastructure projects in Canada are 
traditionally financed using public funds.  
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b) The majority of Pension Funds in Canada consist of Defined Contribution funds while, in 
Australia, they are mainly defined benefit or superannuation funds. The two systems further 
contrast in the funding levels as Australia is well funded and growing fast while the 
Canadian funds are widely regarded as underfunded. The characteristics of Brownfield 
projects are deemed suitable for matching the DB fund liabilities due to the low-risk 
exposure and long term stable and inflation-linked returns.     
c) Both countries have largely fragmented systems with a large number of small Pension 
Funds and also some that are on a global scale. Some of the large funds in both countries 
are amongst the biggest funds in OECD countries. The study finds that the size of the fund 
is crucial for investment in illiquid assets such as infrastructure. The larger funds tend to 
have higher asset allocations to infrastructure assets. 
d) The PPP policy in both countries is very mature. In Australia, the PPP policy has evolved 
in terms of the transfer of demand risk from the private sector to the public sector for 
Greenfield projects. However, in Canada, the privatising of public assets is not popular. The 
few privatised assets operate on a “not-for-profit” strategy and, despite this, they are still 
able to raise financing on the market with bond issuing, etc.  
e) Asset allocation to infrastructure averages 5%; however, larger funds allocate a higher 
percentage relative to the scale of the fund, risk tolerance and the long term outlook of these 
funds. This finding corresponds with research into trends in large Pension Fund investments 
in infrastructure, which found that large Pension Funds in mainly developed countries have 
a specific asset allocation to infrastructure (Della Croce, 2012).  
f) Australian Pension Funds outsource their investment activity (fund management) to 
external fund managers. The funds prefer open-ended investment vehicles; however bigger 
funds are venturing into direct investing into infrastructure assets/projects. Additionally, 
investment has largely been in the form of equity even though debt financing has been 
growing in recent years. 
g) Similarly, in Canada, infrastructure investing is done through listed equities/shares; 
however, debt financing is also on the increase. The mature bond market also allows the 
fund to invest in bonds of infrastructure companies or general infrastructure bonds. Most of 
the infrastructure investments of Canadian investment funds are destined for the overseas 
market because the government largely abstains from large scale privatisation of 
infrastructure assets. The preferred financial instruments have been mainly closed-ended 
funds, direct investment and co-investments, which correspond to observations by OECD 
(2014) as shown in Figure 6.  
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2.5.2 Barriers to Pension Fund investments 
 
Studies conducted by Beeferman(2008); Ehlers( 2014); Inderst( 2010); Inderst and Della 
Croce(2013) and Thierie and Moor (2016) identified various challenges that institutional 
investors encounter in infrastructure investing. The lack or shortage of financing cannot be the 
main impediment to increased infrastructure investment. Ehlers (2014) argues that 
infrastructure investment is lagging despite an ample potential supply of long-term investments 
from institutional investors (such as Pension Funds, insurance companies and other 
Development Financial Institutions) and high infrastructure bottlenecks that exist both in 
developing and developed countries. Government has stopped investing in infrastructure due 
to concerns about affordability and negative public reaction to the raising of taxes to fund 
infrastructures (Beeferman, 2008). The following section compares and contrasts the challenges 
identified by the above researchers and the possible implications for Pension Fund investments 
in infrastructure projects in Namibia as these barriers need to be considered within the context 
of a specific country. 
 
a) A limited supply of projects and high costs of bidding: There is a limited supply of 
projects that are suitably structured and readily bankable. The lack of a project pipeline can 
be attributed to several factors, firstly, a lack of expertise in project structuring or project 
development especially concerning big capital projects. The high costs of expertise 
involved in complex legal and financial arrangement necessary for infrastructure 
investment can be prohibitive if there is not a sufficient and predictable pipeline of 
infrastructure projects (Ehlers, 2014). Bidding costs can be high and if there is no steady 
stream of projects that can increase investors or developers’ chances of success, this can be 
a deterrent to potential developers. The Renewables Energy Independent Power Producer 
Procurement Program (REIPPPP) in South Africa has succeeded through reducing the 
transaction costs by procuring generation capacities of the different renewable projects over 
several bidding rounds. The IPP tariff has come down successively over the various rounds 
(Eberhard et al., 2014) of competitive bidding for generation capacity using specific 
renewable energy technologies.  Investors who failed in the initial round have other 
opportunities to bid in successive rounds thus increasing their chance of success and 
lowering the transaction costs involved in bidding for renewable energy capacity with 
different technologies.  
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The lack of a project pipeline can also be attributed to a lack of funding for project 
development and feasibility studies. Institutional investors, such as Pension Funds, may 
be unwilling to fund a project at an early stage when the risk is significantly higher. 
Venture capitalists, philanthropic investors or Development Financial Institutions (DFIs) 
are crucial in unlocking the private sector investment by providing Catalytic First Loss 
Capital required for feasibility studies and the project development activities.  
b) Infrastructure investments are too risky due to the lack of a legal framework. A 
coherent and trusted legal framework in the form of public-private partnerships (PPPs) 
and public procurement policies are a necessity for infrastructure investment. PPP policies 
need to clearly outline the risk allocation between the public and private sector. The 
Australian PPP policy advocates for demand/market risk to be allocated to the public 
sector as it encourages higher participation by the private sector in PPP projects. The 
REIPPPP program has developed a standardised set of bidding documents which, when 
combined with the different rounds of bidding, have encouraged investors and developers’ 
participation. The standardised bidding document includes the Implementation 
Agreements, Direct Agreements and the Power Purchase Agreement. The involvement of 
construction companies, operators, government authorities/regulators, private investors, 
insurers and project customers/beneficiaries results in complexities that make it vital to 
design an efficient set of contracts or bidding documents.  
 
Risk allocation, as part of the PPP policies, is also a barrier to infrastructure financing and 
developing. The PPP policies should aim to have a fair risk allocation between the private 
and public sectors under the principle of allocating risk to the best party able to manage 
it. Unfair risk allocation may make certain projects unbankable or lead to an increase in 
the cost of services that the infrastructure is meant to provide (Ehlers, 2014). Guarantees 
for political force majeure events are examples of risks that are allocated to governments. 
Allocation of this risk to the private sector will merely force it to obtain private risk 
insurance (PRI) which comes at a cost to the project and the end consumers. Payments to 
PPP projects should be structured to encourage private sector participation and the 
efficiency that comes with the private sector involvement in the provision of public goods 
or services. Governments need to development mechanisms to guarantee foreign 
investment as well as credit enhancement tools to support public entities in contractual 




Figure 10: Risk Allocation and Transfer in PPP Projects       
Source : (Ehlers, 2014) 
 
Political and Regulatory issues/risks may include changes in governments, infrastructure 
and tax policies or uncertainties about carbon pricing and renewable energy initiatives. A 
different government may have different priorities depending on the electoral promises 
made during election campaigns. A government guarantee is one such remedy for political 
and regulatory risks; however, this can be detrimental to a country’s financial standing 
and capacity to borrow. Governments are increasingly unlikely to issue traditional on-
demand and unconditional guarantees due to the effect that they have on their ability to 
borrow and fund critical areas such as social services. Infrastructure projects can be 
profitable to the economy as a whole however they may not be profitable on their own or 
because the political and regulatory risks are too costly to insure (Ehlers, 2014).  
Government support, in the form of either direct financial support or some of form of 
insurance (guarantees), is needed to provide comfort to the project developers that firstly, 
the infrastructure is needed and welcomed and, secondly, it will receive the necessary 
regulatory support. 
 
Greenfield projects have significant construction and patronage risks and are only 
profitable after many years of operation and after a significant portion of the debt has been 
repaid. Many institutional investors prefer to invest in Brownfield projects whose demand, 
revenue stream and profitability is known. Project developers and promoters thus need to 
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develop a mechanism that appeals to risk-averse investors who may be attracted to the 
long-term nature of the infrastructure project but adverse to early-stage risks such as 
construction risks.    
c) Short-termism: Due to the nature of the funds, some investors may have a tendency 
towards short-termism which may not be favourable to long-term investing. The short-
termism may be dependent on whether the fund is a DB or DC.  
d) Liquidity and valuation issues: Infrastructure assets inherently have low liquidity. Pension 
Funds are cautious about holding highly illiquid assets and thus tend to allocate a very small 
percentage to this asset class. Liquidity requirements hinder increased infrastructure 
investment as funds must maintain adequate liquidity which can be attained primarily 
through listed equities and bonds. Furthermore, open funds can face challenges with 
valuations since high volumes flowing in and out of the funds can be experienced during 
high market volatility periods.  
e) Alignment with investment strategies: Funds vary in term of asset valuation, degree of 
openness and whether it is classified as a Defined Benefit (DB) or Defined Contribution 
(DC), which defines the nature of the liabilities. Members from DC funds may have greater 
choice in terms of the risks of their investment/savings and their impact on investment 
strategies. A range of long-term products and investment profiles is thus required to enable 
access by investors of different sizes and risk preferences. Differing investment strategies 
may make it difficult for infrastructure assets not only to compete with international 
infrastructure investment opportunities but also with all other asset classes. 
f) Scale, resources and investment expertise: Infrastructure is inherently complex, with high 
capital requirements and long investment periods. Most of the Pension Funds are not large 
enough in term of assets to have sufficient governance structures, management and 
operational resources (Inderst, 2010). The funds can outsource investment activities to 
external fund managers; however, this does not negate the need for in-house expertise on 
infrastructure investments. Empirical findings suggest that larger Pension Funds have a 
higher than average asset allocation to infrastructure relative to smaller Pension Funds. 
Large Pension Funds, due to their scale, can afford to recruit in-house resources as the level 
of infrastructure investment can justify the cost involved.  
 
The combination of the above factors can create a suboptimal investment environment for 
infrastructure by institutional investors, such as Pension Funds.  
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2.6 Summary of the Chapter  
A Pension Fund’s main purpose is to provide an income to beneficiaries during retirement when 
they are no longer able to work. Beneficiaries and employers contribute premiums to registered 
Pension Funds which are invested prudently to ensure savings grow in the long-term. 
NAMFISA regulates Pension Funds in Namibia. The Namibian Pension Funds industry holds 
significant assets under management which are equivalent to approximately 90% of Namibia’s 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) with most of the Pension Funds’ assets invested abroad. The 
assets of the Pension Funds can be a catalyst for development especially of infrastructure assets 
for the benefit of local beneficiaries and the nation at large.  
 
State and state-owned enterprises dominate the development of infrastructure as evident with 
NDP5. Traditionally sources of financing are debt financing, user fees and government 
subsidies respectively. Funding plans for NDP4 and, by extension, NDP5, forecast a funding 
shortfall of approximately N$ 150 billion. Alternative sources of finance for infrastructure need 
to be investigated in light of the significant funding gap and the fact that institutional investors, 
such as Pension Funds in Namibia, are a viable source of finance. Although the Pension Funds 
possess significant financial muscle, not all these resources can be invested in infrastructure 
assets but rather in a diversified portfolio of assets including infrastructure. 
 
Infrastructure is defined as a set of public works which may include roads, utility lines and 
public buildings which can be further split into economic and social categories. Despite the 
inherent heterogeneity, infrastructure is a unique asset class which is different from properties 
and other asset classes. Economic characteristics, such as high barriers to entry, economies of 
scale, inelastic demands for goods and services, long concession durations and financial 
characteristics make infrastructure finance attractive to a range of investors because of their 
favourable returns, low sensitivity to economic swings, low correlation with other asset classes, 
long term stable return, good inflation and low default rates. The range of economic and 
financial characteristics is not uniform but manifest at varying degrees depending on the 
specific structuring of the infrastructure project or asset. The investment vehicles can range 
from direct to indirect and from over-the-counter (unlisted) to listed instruments with varying 




Furthermore, investment vehicles have different features in terms of investment horizons, 
liquidity risks, capital requirements and political and regulatory risks that need to be carefully 
evaluated in choosing the investment vehicles and appropriate financial instruments (debt or 
equity). The inherent heterogeneity of infrastructure translates into a wider risk-return 
spectrum, ranging from low risk and low return to high risk and high return. The risk profile is 
affected by many factors which range from construction risks to operation and maintenance 
risks. The overall risk profile of an infrastructure asset varies throughout the asset’s lifecycle. 
Institutional investors, such as Pension Funds, are viewed as natural investors in infrastructure 
as their long-term liability matches perfectly with the financial characteristics described above.  
 
Australia and Canadian Pension Fund industries are leaders in terms of investing in 
infrastructure development with the highest percentage of investment in infrastructure relative 
to the overall fund size. The industries are inherently different as Australian Pension Funds are 
mainly categorised as Defined Benefit (DB) while Canada’s are Defined Contributions (DC). 
Differences also arise in terms of the financial instruments or vehicles utilised in the two 
countries with Australia mastering PPP procurement processes while Canadian investment has 
been mainly through listed equities and bonds. The lesson from the Australian and Canadian 
Pension Fund industries presents numerous obstacles which hinder higher participation in 
infrastructure finance. These challenges include, amongst others, a lack of project pipeline, an 
inadequate legal framework for PPPs, unfair or inappropriate risk allocation in PPP projects, 
high political and regulatory risks, short-termism, varying investment strategies and a lack of 
internal resources and expertise in Pension Funds to manage infrastructure investment in-house.  
The combination of the above factors can create a suboptimal investment environment for 
infrastructure, especially in developing countries, such as Namibia, where financial markets 
and regulatory environments are not fully developed. 
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CHAPTER 3: Research methodology 
 
3.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter provides an overview of the research design followed in conducting the research 
and addressing the research questions and objectives. This section aims to provide information 
on the appropriate philosophy and the implementation of the research. This chapter comprises 
five sections, (i) the research approach which relates to the philosophy that was employed; (ii) 
the unit of analysis, population and sampling approaches in terms of data gathering, formatting 
and sampling techniques used in data collection; (iv) the data collection process that covers the 
methodology of administering the questionnaire, the analytical framework that addresses how 
the data were organised and analysed to reach a meaningful conclusion; and (v) the approach 
that was employed to ensure the internal validity and reliability of the research findings.  
3.2 Research Approach  
 
The design of the research was both exploratory and descriptive due to the nature of the research 
questions and objectives.  The research philosophy employed aimed to validate the findings 
from previous researches concerning the topic in the Namibian context as well as to identify 
any other factors that may impede greater investment by Pension Funds. The philosophy 
employed necessitated the use of a mixed-method research approach which was a combination 
of quantitative and qualitative research approaches. The mixed-method approach was 
warranted by the fact that previous studies by Beeferman (2008); Bitsch (2012); Della Croce & 
Yermo (2013); Ehlers (2014); Inderst & Stewart (2014); Thierie & Moor (2016) have proven 
that the topic under investigation is multi-dimensional and by the need to guarantee the validity 
and reliability of research methods and findings. A purely qualitative or quantitative approach 
is inherently biased and could be neutralised by using both methods (Creswell, 2003). The 
purpose of this research was to understand what, how and why Namibian Pension Funds only 
make negligible investments in infrastructure, which necessitated a mixed-method approach 
(Hesse-Biber & Johnson, 2015).  
 
Two designs could be used for data collection in a mixed-method research approach, firstly a 
convergent parallel design where qualitative and quantitative data are collected simultaneously. 
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Secondly, an explanatory and exploratory sequential design where either qualitative or 
quantitative data are collected first depending on which aspect is the driving component. The 
convergent parallel approach was selected for this research to provide a comprehensive 
understanding of the problem statements and answer the research question and objectives. The 
qualitative data were collected simultaneously with quantitative data as part of the 
questionnaire. Survey participants were required to substantiate their responses to the questions 
which formed the qualitative aspects of the questionnaire. 
 
The combination of qualitative and quantitative methods also helped to adopt a multi-faceted 
and deeper understanding of the issue under investigation. The research approach also 
subscribed to the positivist philosophy, which restricts the researcher’s role in data collection 
and interpretation. Positivism philosophy has been found to lead to findings that are observable 
and quantifiable. The segregation of the researcher's subjectivity from the topics being 
investigated presents the main challenge to positivist philosophy as the two aspects are 
increasingly intertwined especially when the researcher analyses and summarises the findings.  
 
3.3 Unit of analysis, population, sampling technique and sample size  
 
The target population consisted of representatives of Pension Funds, such as administrators, 
principal officers and Investment Managers including asset/fund managers and infrastructure 
investment analysts who are traditionally involved in managing Pension Fund assets and 
investing in infrastructure. Primary data were collected through the use of a questionnaire that 
was administered to the sample group. The questionnaire collected data in both quantitative 
(nominal, ordinal and ratio scale) and qualitative data formats. The research aimed to analyse 
industry practice about individual Pension Funds and asset managers which was summated to 
adopt a view of the industry as a whole.  The participants in the surveys were divided into two 
separate groups, one consisting of Pension Fund principal officers, administrators and trustees 
and the other group comprising asset/fund managers and infrastructure financing specialists. 
Information on the population of Pension Funds and asset managers was sourced from the 
financial institution regulator, NAMFISA.   
 
The samples from the first group (Pension Fund) were selected using a probabilistic method 
based on the stratified random sampling methods to reduce bias whilst the sample from the 
second group (Investment Managers and Unlisted Investment Managers) was selected using a 
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simple random sampling technique. Both groups of respondents were subject to the qualitative 
and quantitative aspects of the questionnaire. A sample is defined as a portion, segment or a 
piece that is representative of the whole (population).  The research sample consisted of 13 
respondents representing four (4) Pension Funds, four (4) respondents representing four (4) 
Investment Managers and one unlisted Investment Manager Respondent from the population 
listed in Table 28, Table 29, and Table 30 in Appendices B, C and D respectively.  Both groups 
were subjected to the questionnaire in Appendix A1 which consisted of a combination of 
qualitative and qualitative questions which is standard in a mixed-method research approach. 
As reviewed in section 2.2, the Pension Fund industry is dominated by a few funds that account 
for more than two-thirds of the assets; therefore, the stratified random sampling ensured an 
accurate representation of the industry in the sample. The Pension Funds were categorised into 
strata according to the assets under management as follows:   
 
Category 1: N$ 0–250 million;  
Category 2: N$250 million – 1 billion; 
Category 3: N$ 1 – 3 billion;  
Category 4: > N$ 3 billion 
 
3.4 Data collection process   
 
The data collection processes followed a convergent parallel approach as the qualitative and 
quantitative aspects were part of the questionnaire as detailed in sections 2.5.2 and 3.4. The 
primary data were obtained by administering the questionnaire to fund managers and principal 
officers for each sampled Pension Fund and Investment Managers’ representatives. The 
questionnaire was structured based on the findings in the literature particularly the challenges 
that have hindered Pension Fund investments in infrastructure as detailed in section 2.5.2. 
Figure 11 below maps out the questions to the factors alluded to in the literature review, more 
specifically section 2.5.2.  Research participants completed the survey via a web portal which 
is designed in accordance with questionnaires for both Pension Fund and Investment Manager 
Respondents as shown in Appendix A. As per the positivism approach discussed above, the 
role of the researcher in the data collection processes were limited to clarification of questions 







Figure 11: Barrier – questionnaire enquiry linkages 
 
3.5 Data Analytical Framework 
 
The goal of this research was to test existing theoretical frameworks as well as unearth new 
perspectives in the Namibian context. Given the mixed-method approach, the analysis followed 
a combination of deductive and inductive methods as necessitated by the qualitative and 
quantitative data. Both qualitative and quantitative data were analysed per sample group and 
summated to form a view on the industry as a whole and answer the research questions and 
meet the research objectives. Quantitative data were analysed primarily using the descriptive 
techniques and factor analysis to confirm which factors (questions and responses) are 
significant. In factor analysis, factors contribute significantly or regarded as important if their 
factor scores/weight is greater than or equal to 0.5, either positively or negatively. In factor 
Factors hindering increased 
investment by pension fund 
into infrastructure
Lack of project pipeline 14, 21-26






Scale of investments is high Q14 & 20
Investment too risky Q4, 18, 20, 25-26
Short termism investment 
strategies 
Q9-13, 16
Lack of expertise 
/understanding of 
infrastructure assets
Q1-3, 5 - 8 





analysis, there are typically as many factors as there are variables, however, only factors whose 
eigenvalues are greatest and above one(1) account for the most variability and thus use in the 
analysis in Chapter 4.  
 
The questionnaire’s reliability and internal consistency were tested using the Cronbach’s Alpha 
Coefficient with the aid of Microsoft add-in XLSTAT. The dichotomous variable was 
transformed to a Likert scale chart with a scale of 1–5, where a YES (1) translated to a four (4) 
and NO (0) translated to a two (2) to allow an internal consistency test of a continuous variable 
using the Cronbach Alpha test. Tests for sample adequacy were carried out using the Kaiser-
Meyer-Olkin (KMO).  
 
Qualitative data analysis is a technique for methodically describing the meaning of qualitative 
data and aims to bring order, structure and meaning to data (Flick, 2014). The research 
employed a narrative analysis in the evaluation of the primary qualitative data provided in the 
questionnaire. The narrative data analysis aimed to compare and contrast research participants’ 
experiences within the context of existing theoretical frameworks covered in the literature 
review. Research participants provided a qualitative response to justify their answers. The 
analysis focused on the data to help in answering the research question. The key narratives and 
themes observed in the data collected were compared and contrasted against existing theoretical 
frameworks in arriving at the conclusions, answering the research questions and satisfying the 
research objectives. 
 
3.6 Validity and reliability  
 
Saunders et al. (2007) discussed the following pitfalls that could undermine the credibility of 
research findings.  These measures are taken to guarantee the research findings’ validity and 
reliability.  
 
Construct validity typically originates from the lack of sufficient data measurement points or 
the use of subjective judgement to collect data. To address the concerns, the researcher 
established a causal relationship between the concept and the study objectives based on existing 
literature. As highlighted with the requirement of the positivist approach, which aims for 
objective interpretation, the researcher is fully cognisant of the risk of subjectivism during data 
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collection and analysis and endeavoured to eliminate any bias. The sample size was determined 
to attain high confidence of 99% to ensure that the construct validity was not compromised.  
 
Internal validity typically concerns establishing causal relationships between different facets 
of the research to lend the research internal validity. The concepts and frameworks to be tested 
in the Namibian context have been well researched in another setting, so the relationship to the 
research questions and objectives has been established.   
 
External validity concerns the degree to which the research findings can be generalised or 
applied to other research settings (Saunders et al., 2007). It will not be required to extrapolate 
the research findings to other settings as the findings are from a specific context. The research 
findings may apply to another scenario however they must still be validated in that specific 
context. The literature review, which forms the basis for data collection and analysis, was based 
on studies in similar settings so the causal relationships between concepts and research 
objectives have already been tested.  
 
Reliability concerns the extent to which data collected using this technique yielded consistent 
findings. The reliability can be assessed by addressing the following questions:  
i) Will the survey yield the same findings on a different occasion? 
ii) Will comparable observations be reached by other observers? 
iii) Is there transparency in terms of how the raw data are interpreted?  
The researcher aimed to investigate the topic systematically as discussed in the research method 
and methodology to guarantee the reliability of the study. The researcher’s knowledge and 
experience are crucial to ensuring the reliability of the findings especially when it concerns the 




CHAPTER 4: Findings and data analysis  
4.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter presents an overview of the research findings and data analysis based on the 
qualitative and quantitative research methods discussed in Chapter 3. The chapter consists of 
the six (6) sections: (i) an introduction; (ii) review of profile of survey respondents, (iii) review 
of factor analysis results, (iv) a review of Pension Fund attitudes toward infrastructure as an 
asset class; (v) a review of factors hindering Pension Fund investment in infrastructure; and (vi) 
the impact of Pension Fund regulation on infrastructure investing. The survey results have been 
classified in the categories presented in sections 2.5.2 and 3.5 and widely attributed as barriers 
to Pension Fund investment in infrastructure.  
 
4.2 Profile of Respondents 
 
Table 8 displays high-level profiles of respondents that were sampled and surveyed as part of 
data collection processes.  Appendix E shows the survey responses, and coded responses for 
the Investment Manager and Pension Fund questionnaires respectively. The survey participants 
account for a significant portion of assets for both the Pension Fund and Asset Management 
(Investment Manager) Industry. The observation made as part of the analysis that follows may, 
as a result, apply to the entire industry,   
 
Table 8: Respondent Profiles 
 Investment Manager  Pension Fund  
Number Of Respondents  13 4 
Number Of Institutions 4 4 
Assets (N$) 81 Billion 130 Billion 
Smallest Assets 350 Million 150 Million 
Largest Assets 40 Billion 110 Billion 
 
4.3 Factor Analysis Results  
 
Factor analysis results for both the Pension Fund and Investment Manager sample groups are 
shown in Table 9. Factor Analysis result yielded a total of seven latent factors for Pension Fund 
sample group and two latent factors for Investment Manager respectively. The eigenvalue 
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measures how much variance observed in variables can be explained by the factor. Factors with 
eigenvalues greater than or equal to one (1) account for more variance than a single observed 
variable. The internal consistency of the construct and questionnaire is measured by mean of a 
Cronbach's alpha test. Any Cronbach's alpha value above 0.5 is generally acceptable but 
considered “poor” if below 0.6. Similarly, Cronbach's alpha value of greater than or equal to 
0.6 is considered an indication of good internal consistency of the construct. Sample adequacy 
is established with the use of KMO test, whereby value above 0.5 is acceptable however only 
values above 0.6 are considered an indicator of good sample adequacy. Pension Fund factor 
analysis results reveal that five (5) latent factors have eigenvalues and Cronbach's alpha below 
the 1 and 0.5 thresholds and therefore were not used in any further analysis. The eigenvalue 
and Cronbach’s alpha value for the first two latent factors (F1 & F2) as shown in Table 9 are 
well within the acceptable range. F1 scores carry a greater weight and importance as compared 
to F2 as it accounts for higher variability in the latent factor. F2 factor scores only supersede 
F1 scores only when F1 scores are not significant and when F2 scores are significantly greater 
than F1 scores. The KMO test result of 0.57 is at the bottom end of the acceptable scales which 
indicate poor sample adequacy. The cumulative variability explained by the first two factor is 
below 50% which may be due to poor samples adequacy (KMO) test result of 0.570.  Table 10 
shows the KMO measure of sampling adequacy results for observation from individual 
respondents which confirms that all respondents’ observations except respondent K met the 
KMO test for sample adequacy of 0.5.  
 
Similarly, the Investment Manager factor analysis results yielded two latent factors of which 
only one (1) have an acceptance eigenvalue and Cronbach's alpha value as shown in Table 9. 
The KMO test for sample adequacy results is well within the acceptance range of the scale. F1 
account for 56% of the variability observed. The analysis of factor scores for all variables is 
discussed in section 0, 4.5, and 4.6 and mostly focus on Factor 1(F1) and Factor 2(F2) for 
Pension Funds and Factor 1(F1) for Investment Manager sample groups respectively.  A factor 
score is a numerical value that indicates a variable’s relative importance on a latent factor.   










Table 9:  Factor Analysis Results Summary 
 




Eigenvalue  3,678 2,199 0,93 0,48 0,29 0,17 0,07 





7,2% 3,7% 2,2% 0,9% 0,5% 
Cumulative variability (%)  28,3% 45,2 52,4% 56,1 58,3 59,2 59,7 
Investment Manager  
KMO 0,797 
 
Eigenvalue  2,818 0,245 - - - - - 
Cronbach’s Alpha 0,870 0,862 - - - - - - 
Average Variance 
Explained 
 56,4% 4,9% - - - - - 
Cumulative variability (%)  56,4% 61,3      
 
Table 10: Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Result for individual respondents 
Respondents  Pension Funds Investment Manager 
A 0,791 0,874 
B 0,523 0,869 
C 0,523 0,737 
D 0,523 0,728 

















Overall  0,570 0,797 
 
4.4 Pension Fund attitudes toward Infrastructure as an asset class  
 
As highlighted in the literature, the infrastructure asset class is a natural match for the Pension 
Fund and Pension Fund liabilities. The survey reveals that a slight majority (53%) of 
respondents representing Pension Fund principal officers and administrators do not consider 
infrastructure as a unique asset class with distinct economic and financial characteristics. This 
variable (Pension Fund attitude towards infrastructure as a unique asset class with distinct 
economic and financial characteristics) has a significant negative factor (F2 Scores) loading 
which confirms that Pension Fund does not recognise infrastructure as a separate asset class. 
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On the contrary, 100% of respondents representing Investment Managers view infrastructure 
as a unique asset class as confirmed by F1 factor scores, which shows that these criteria 
contribute positively and significantly to the underlying factor, as depicted in Table 11. The 
diverse views between the Pension Funds and Investment Managers on infrastructure as an 
asset class highlight the degree to which Pension Fund principal officers and administrators are 
involved in formulating investment policies, active management of Pension Fund assets and 
their dependency on external consultants and specialists in developing investment policies and 
managing investments.  A few Pension Fund respondents acknowledged infrastructure as a 
unique asset class mainly due to feature such as (i) attractive returns, (ii) low correlation of 
infrastructure to other asset classes and (iii) long term stable and predictable returns, however, 
neither of these factors contributes positively on any factors scores (F1 and F2) as shown in 
Table 12.  
 
Table 11: Factor Score and Descriptive Statistics for “Attitude towards infrastructure as a unique asset class with distinct 
economic and financial characteristics?” variable 
Bold value denotes significant variables   
Yes No F1  F2  
Pension Fund 46% 54% 0,36 -1,584 
Investment Manager 100% 0% 1,40 
 
 
Based on Investment Manager factor analysis results in Table 12, the following three variables 
contribute positively(F1) towards the underlying factor; (i) stable returns, (ii) long term stable 
and predictable returns, and (iii) good inflation hedged returns. 
 
Table 12: Factor Score and Descriptive Statistics for “Infrastructure's financial and economic characteristics” variables  
Bold value denotes significant factors   
Investment Manager  Pension Fund   
% Response F1  % Response F1  F2 
Attractive  Returns 40% 0,437 50% -0,099 -0,856 
Stable (Low Sensitivity To Economic 
Cycles)  Returns 
80% 1,121 50% -0,407 -0,178 
Low Correlation With Other Asset 
Classes( Diversification Potential) 
20% -0,244 50% -0,319 -0,937 
Long Term Stable And Predictable 
Returns 
60% 0,737 50% -0,478 -0,004 
Good Inflation Hedged Returns 80% 1,121 33% -0,646 0,272 
Low Default Rate  40% -0,03 17% -0,698 0,275 




Sampled Pension Fund respondents with a positive view on infrastructure asset class maintain 
a target asset allocation as part of investment policy that ranges between 1.5 and 2.5%. These 
findings validate reported statistics in Table 2 which show that actual disbursement toward the 
unlisted investment of 0.7% is below the minimum requirement of 1.75%.  Based on the 
reported statistic by NAMFISA and information provided by respondents as part of the survey, 
respondents recognise that Pension Fund investment in infrastructure is below best practice 
standards of 10 to 15% set by Pension Funds in Canada and Australia respectively.   
 
 F1 scores for Pension Fund respondents, shown in Table 13, reveal that variables, such as (i) 
high capital requirement and (ii) low liquidity have a positive and significant loading meaning 
that these variables make infrastructure unattractive. F1 score for other variables has negative 
scores meaning they do not influence the attractiveness of infrastructure assets. This confirms 
earlier findings that Pension Funds largely do not recognise infrastructure as a unique asset 
class due to factors such as perceived low liquidity and high capital requirement. F1 scores for 
Investment Managers factor analysis results revealed that all variables listed in Table 13 have 
a negative and significant score, which implies that these variables do not contribute to making 
infrastructure asset unattractive.  The results confirm earlier findings that Investment Manager 
Respondents find infrastructure assets largely attractive and recognise infrastructure assets as a 
unique asset class.  
 
Table 13: Factor Score and Descriptive Statistics for “Infrastructure features that are not attractive to investors” variables 
Bold value denotes significant factors   
Investment Manager  Pension Fund   
% Response F1 % Response F1 F2 
Low liquidity 20% -0,30 100% 1,514 0,497 
investment too risky 0% -0,56 29% -0,399 -0,352 
 Long investment horizon 0% -0,56 14% -0,683 0,247 
 Lack of financial instruments 0% -0,56 14% -0,683 0,247 
 High capital requirement 20% -0,30 71% 1,013 1,391 










4.5 Factors hindering Pension Fund investment in infrastructure  
4.5.1 Lack of project pipeline 
 
An overwhelming majority of the Investment Managers (80%) and Pension Funds (77%) 
indicated that there is no steady stream of bankable infrastructure projects/opportunities in 
Namibia. As shown in Table 14, F2 scores revealed that this variable has a negative factor 
loading for both Pension Fund and Investment Manager Questionnaires; however, only the 
Pension Fund has a significant factor loading meaning that there is no “steady stream of 
bankable infrastructure project”.  
 
Table 14: Factor Score and Descriptive Statistics for “Steady stream of bankable infrastructure projects/opportunities” 
variable 
Bold value denotes significant factors   
Yes No F1 F2 
Investment Manager 23% 77% -0,24  
 
Pension Fund 20% 80% -0,34  -0,97  
 
According to Investment Manager Responses, all variables, with exception of “lack or 
ineffective public private partnership” and “lack of financial instrument”, have a positive and 
significant F1 score meaning that they all contribute to the lack of a project pipeline. Similarly, 
factor analysis results of Pension Fund responses revealed the following three variables have a 
positive and significant F1 score which confirms that they also contribute to lack of project 
pipeline; (i) a lack or ineffective public private partnership policies, (ii) a lack of government 
support and (iii) a lack of infrastructure development plans, as shown in Table 15. The other 
variables all have a negative and significant F1 score indicating they do not contribute to the 
lack of project pipeline. The lack of project pipeline in Namibia supports Ehlers (2014) and 
Eberhard et al. (2014)’s observations that the associated increase in transaction cost can be 











Table 15: Factor Score and Descriptive Statistics for “Factors attributed to a lack of a project pipeline” variables 
Bold value denotes significant factors   
Investment Manager  Pension Fund   
% 
Response 
F1  % Response F1  F2  
 Project not viable on their own 60% 0,69 8% -0,70 0,28 
 Lack of financial instruments 40% 0,44 23% -0,63 0,17 
 Infrastructure project not sufficiently 
development 
80% 1,01 31% -0,22 0,04 
 Implementing agencies Lack of 
expertise in project development 
60% 0,75 15% -0,67 0,202 
 Lack or ineffective public 
procurement policies and processes 
100% 1,4 23% -0,36 -0,39 
 Lack or ineffective public private 
partnership policies 
40% 0,48 38% 1,03 1,43 
 Lack of government support 80% 1,08 23% 0,98 1 
 Lack of infrastructure Development 
Plan 
40% 0,44 54% 1,42 0,67 
 Unfair risk allocation to private 
parties in PPP Projects 
60% 0,82 8% -0,7 0,28 
 Lack of Project Preparation(feasibility 
Studies) Funding 
60% 0,75 15% -0,66 0,29 
 
The descriptive statistics in Table 16 shows that Investment Manager view existing PPP and 
Public Procurement policies largely to be effective however this view has been rejected because 
the F1score for both variables are not significant. Pension fund respondent, however, views 
public procurement policies to be effective based on descriptive statistics however this variable 
is also not significant. PPP policies are viewed as effective and efficient by pension fund 
responses as confirmed with both descriptive statistics, F1 and 2 scores which are positive and 
significant as depicted in Table 16. 
 
Table 16: Factor Score and Descriptive Statistics for “Effectiveness and Efficiency of Public Policies” Variable 
Bold value denotes significant factors   
Investment Manager  Pension Funds  
Yes No  F1  Yes No  F1   F2  
Public Procurement Policies  50% 50% 0,29 12% 65% - 0,42 -0,13 
Public Private Partnership Policies  75% 25% 0,01 47% 29% 1,47 0,67 
 
Survey participants provided the following motivation with their response to the lack of project 
pipeline, effectiveness and efficiency of Public Procurement and PPP policies.   
 
Respondent A: “Often infrastructure projects are very high in value and then government 




Respondent B: “The Namibian PPP act is a well-written piece of legislation. The bottlenecks 
are the government's lack of coordination and a lack of project preparation and financial 
structuring” 
 
Respondent C: “Existing legislation does not have a track record in the procurement of big 
capital projects etc.”  
 
Respondent D: “TOO slow - same as above some regulations work directly against each other”  
 
Respondent E: “Legislation, policies and regulation are relatively new and there is no track 
record in the successful execution of PPP Projects” 
 
The lack of or ineffective public procurement policies can be attributed to a lack of a project 
pipeline is accurate to some degree because of the Public Procurement Act no. 15 of 2015 which 
was promulgated on the 1st April 2017. The Public Procurement Act governs the procurement 
of goods, works and services by Government ministries, public entities (state-owned entities) 
and local authorities.  Government and public entities are tasked with infrastructure 
development, however, no significant works procurements exceeding N$ 100 million were 
awarded since the act came into effect which confirms the above responses from respondents 
that Public procurement do not have track record and effectiveness and efficiency still have to 
be proven.  
 
Major construction works contracts, such as the Nekartal Dam Project and the Strategic 
National Oil Storage Facility, were procured and awarded by under earlier policies that were 
run by the Tender Board of Namibia. The value of the two projects was approximately N$ 6 
billion each at the time of completion. The Public Procurement Act is benchmarked against 
world-class practices and endorsed by institutions such as the World Bank. However, the policy 
rollout and implementation was not gradual and the centralisation of the major procurement 
activities at the Central Procurement Board(CPB) for all procurements exceeding a certain 
threshold, essentially created excessive bureaucracy, bottlenecks and inefficiencies in the 




Similarly, the Public Private Partnership Act no. 4 of 2017 came into effect in December 2018 
therefore, it has no track record. A few public-private partnership transactions were completed 
before the enactment of the PPP Act however, these were limited to bulk housing infrastructure 
projects and were transactional because the operation and maintenance of the assets are returned 
to the public sector after construction. The government is relying on PPP policies and 
regulations to attract private investment in infrastructure development given the dwindling 
government budgetary and borrowing capacity. Traditionally, infrastructure projects are 
financed from the government's budgetary allocation, user fees and borrowings.  
 
As confirmed by research participants, infrastructure projects typically have a high upfront 
capital investment which can be mired in corruption due to a lack of transparency in 
procurement processes. This is evident in the cancellation of infrastructure projects, such as the 
expansion of Hosea Kutako International airport (Office of the President, 2015) and the upgrade 
of Ondangwa Airport runway (Routh, 2019), due to ballooning costs and irregularities in 
awarding of the tenders.   
 
4.5.2 Financial Instruments  
 
Pension Fund and Investment Managers acknowledge based on descriptive statistics and factor 
analysis(F1 score) that financial instrument does match Pension Fund investment strategies 
with respect to risk and return as depicted in Table 17. This view, however, conflicts with 
finding in section 4.4 and 4.5.2 where a majority of Pension Fund respondents do not recognise 
infrastructure as a unique asset class with distinct economic and financial characteristics and 
the mismatch between investors’ expectations with regard to various facets of financial 
instruments as later reviewed in section 4.5.2.2 - 4.5.2.5. The characteristics of the unlisted 
equities on key aspects such as liquidity, the scale of investment, exposure to political and 
regulatory risks and investment horizon are aligned to Bitsch et al. (2010) ‘s observation in the 
empirical study on “Risk, Return and Cash flow characteristics of infrastructure fund 
investments”.  
 
Table 17: Factor Score and Descriptive Statistics for “financial Instrument alignment with Pension Fund or asset manager 
investment strategy (risk-return)” variable 
Bold value denotes significant factors   
Yes No  F1  F2  
Investment Manager 100% 0% 1,40  
 




The following section analyses various facets of the preferred instrument in greater detail. It 
will be revealed, through factor and descriptive analysis, contrary to the above findings, 
financial instruments largely do not match Pension Fund requirements such as liquidity, risk 
exposure and scale of capital investment.  
 
4.5.2.1 Lack of financial assets/instruments 
 
The lack of a project pipeline could partly be attributed to a lack of financial instruments 
matching investors’ requirements such as liquidity, the scale of investment, investment horizon 
and risk exposure. The majority (77%) of Pension Fund respondents indicated that they invest 
in infrastructure via “unlisted equity” while the Investment Manager has a preference for “direct 
borrowing”. Regulations 28 and 29 have encouraged Pension Funds to invest in infrastructure 
through licenced Unlisted Investment Managers (UIM). Pension Fund’s F1 Score shows that 
unlisted (private) equity variable which has a positive and significant score meaning that it is 
the preferred financial instrument for investing in infrastructure. All the other variables 
(financial instruments) have a negative and significant F1 score meaning that they are not 
preferred financial instrument. Investment Manager observation shows that a few variables 
have a negative and significant factor F1 scores meaning that they are not widely used for 
investing in infrastructure. The two variable, (i) Unlisted (Private) Equity and (ii) Direct 
Borrowing (OTC)/Debt does not have a significant score. The lack of listed infrastructure 
shares and funds on the Namibian Stock Exchange could thus be attributed to a lack of Pension 
Fund investment in infrastructure, especially via listed shares and funds as evident in the 
responses in Table 18. The above findings confirm observation is a similar survey by Pregin 
which shows that institutional investors have a preference for unlisted equities (OECD, 2014) 










Table 18: Factor Score and Descriptive Statistics for Investment Manager and Pension Fund Preferred financial instrument 
for infrastructure investment variables 
Bold value denotes significant factors   
Investment Manager  Pension Fund   
% Response F1 % Response F1 F2 
Listed Funds 0% -0,56 0% -0,707 0,32 
Listed Equities/Shares 0% -0,56 0% -0,707 0,32 
Unlisted( Private) Equity 20% 0,16 77% 2,142 -0,893 
Unlisted Funds 20% -0,29 15% -0,488 0,041 
Direct Borrowing(OTC) - 
Debt 
40% 0,14 0% -0,707 0,32 
Bonds 0% -0,56 8% -0,665 0,283 
Other 20% -0,30 0% -0,707 0,32 
 
4.5.2.2 Highly illiquid assets/instruments 
 
Investment Managers and Pension Fund respondents both view unlisted equities as highly 
illiquid, which may be a deterrent to some investors as confirmed by the significant negative 
factor F1 Score as indicated in Table 19. This finding confirms existing work by Bitsch et al. 
(2010) that unlisted equities and direct debt are illiquid. Liquidity is often associated with an 
investment horizon hence a long term investment is likely to be less liquid. 
 
Table 19: Factor Score and Descriptive Statistics for “Liquidity level of preferred instrument” variable   
Bold value denotes significant factors   
Investment Manager  Pension Funds  
Response % F1  Response %  F1  F2  
 Liquidity Levels? 
 














The requirements for unlisted investment, as part of Regulations 28 and 29 however, mandate 
Pension Funds to invest in this asset class irrespective of whether they are liquid or not. Survey 
respondents provided the following response to justify the highly illiquid nature of unlisted 
equities, the preferred financial instruments.  
 
Respondent A: “There is no secondary market for these assets so once you have made the 
investment you are typically locked in until you can recoup your investment through the 




Respondent B: “It often takes at least seven years to repay sufficient capital for the equity to 
have value. It is easier to refinance the debt”        
 
Respondent C: “Listed assets Fund are easily tradable”      
 
Respondent D: “Namibian bonds are not liquid”       
 
As confirmed with the above qualitative response, “It often takes at least seven years to repay 
sufficient capital for the equity to have value”. Hence equity investors are likely to be invested 
in these assets until sufficient return on investment has been made. Respondents also attribute 
the lack of liquidity to a lack of a secondary market for infrastructure assets; hence, once the 
investment has been made, the investors are typically locked in until they can recoup their 
investments through the annuity payment stream. Respondents acknowledge that listed equities 
are a preferred instrument for investment in infrastructure largely because they are liquid and 
allow them to divest at any point in time. Furthermore, responses acknowledge that Namibian 
bonds, especially non-government bonds are highly illiquid which may be a drawback to 
infrastructure investing. The above qualitative findings are aligned to the descriptive statistics 
and factors analysis results (F1) in Table 19.  
 
4.5.2.3 The scale of investments is too high 
 
Table 20 shows that, according to respondents, the scale of investment required for preferred 
financial instruments ranges between medium and high scales. Similarly, F2 score for Pension 
Fund is positive and significant which implies that the scale of investment required for 
infrastructure investment may be too high. The scale of the investment required may prove to 
be a challenge, given the fragmented nature of the Pension Fund industry in Namibia. 
Investment Manager F1 score does not a significant factor loading partly due to the aggregation 
of pension fund investment at fund manager level. Most of the samples pension fund 
respondents represent Pension Fund with larger assets which can explain the divergent F1 and 
F2 score. A smaller segment of pension fund respondents has the view that the scale of capital 






Table 20: Factor Score and Descriptive Statistics for “Scale of capital investment of preferred instrument” variable  
Bold value denotes significant factors   
Investment Manager  Pension Funds  
Response % F1  Response % F1 F2 
4. Scale Of Capital Investment? 
 














 Survey respondents provided the following responses to motivate for the high scale of capital 
investment required for infrastructure assets.  
 
Respondent A: “Our fund is very small so we can't fund large infrastructure projects”     
 
Respondent B: “about 1% of the Fund”        
 
Respondent C: “N$ 20 to 100 million or more per project and package”      
 
Respondent D: “We manage large pools of money for large institutional investors and 
therefore we typically have a large ticket to make into infra assets”    
  
Investment Managers have a large number of investors and are more likely to achieve the 
required scale to invest in large scale infrastructure initiatives as alluded by respondents above. 
On average most Pension Funds have total assets under management that are less than N$ 100 
million and, in the absence of listed/unlisted funds, small to medium-sized Pension Funds may 
not be able to gain the required scale to invest in infrastructure. Pension Fund respondents 
acknowledge that small fund size does not allow investments in large infrastructure projects. 
Regulations 28 and 29 have given rise to several Unlisted Investment Managers who can pool 
investments from several Pension Funds to gain the necessary scale to invest in infrastructure 
assets; however, Pension Funds are also limited to invest a maximum of 3.5% of the assets with 
unlisted investments. The Namibia pension fund industry shares similar characteristics with the 
Australian and Canadian Pension fund industry in that they are highly fragmented with a large 
number of smaller pension funds.  The scale of the investment may equally be a barrier to 
pension fund investment in infrastructure development. Similarly, Investment Managers may 
pool large funds to allow small Pension Fund capacity to invest in a big capital infrastructure 
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project. The 3.5% limitation may make it impossible to achieve the scale required to invest in 
infrastructure assets.  
 
4.5.2.4 Financial Instrument Riskiness 
 
Respondents indicated, as per Table 21 and as confirmed with F2 score that the risk level of the 
financial instrument used for infrastructure investment ranges between medium and high levels. 
Survey participants provided the following response about the high-risk exposure and 
mitigation steps;  
 
Respondent A: “We typically only invest in infra projects with a proven income stream that 
makes commercial sense. We also ensure that there are strong guarantees in place as well as 
covenants, and performance clauses. This removes a lot of the risk in the investment but we will 
typically still be exposed to political risk and for this, we take out risk cover as well. The main 
issue with this type of investment is the lack of liquidity, political and regulatory risks involved”
             
Respondent B:  “Most infrastructure deals have long term annuity income streams - these are 
ideal for pension funds”           
 
Respondent C: “The assets are generally collateralized”       
 
Large Pension Funds and Investment Managers can reduce their risk exposure by minimising 
the scale of investment in any single project, typically less than 1%. Investment Managers 
typically required strong guarantees, collateral, covenant and performance clauses in Finance 
Documents/Agreements as a means to reduce investment risks. Political risk mitigation steps 
may include political risk insurances; however, residual risk may remain high due to low 
liquidity and exposure to regulatory risk.  Financial and technically capable developers who are 
willing to take on the upfront construction risk may also de-risk the project however these are 








Table 21: Factor Score and Descriptive Statistics for “Riskiness of Preferred instrument” variable  
Bold value denotes significant factors   
Investment Manager  Pension Funds  
Response % F1  Response% F1  F2  
3. Riskiness? 
 













5. Exposure To Regulatory And 
Political Risks  
 














Similarly, the findings in Table 21, show that, given the investment horizon (term) and the level 
of exposure to political and regulatory risk associated with unlisted equities (preferred financial 
instruments), the risk level ranges between moderate and high. There is a correlation in risk 
rating, survey response and F1 and F2 Scores between political and regulatory risks and overall 
financial instrument riskiness, as shown in Table 21. F2 score has a positive and significant 
factor loading which confirms a high level of exposure to regulatory and political risks. 
Regulations 28 and 29 limit investment to 3.5% of assets partly because infrastructure 
investment is considered to be high risk.  
 
Disproportionate risk allocation between the private and private sector can also result in high 
investment risks. The principles of allocating risk to the party best placed to manage risk must 
be strictly adhered to de-risk infrastructure investment and unlock the potential to catalyse 
development and economic growth. Table 22 below shows that Investment Managers views 
that private sectors bear the most risk in PPP Projects while Pension Fund respondents believe 
that the public sector bears the most risk in PPP projects. F1 and F2 scores for both respondents 
confirm that the public sector assumes more risk than the private sector. The private sector in 
developed countries naturally assumes demand risk; however, there are still instances where 
the public sector is best placed to manage demand risk. A gas-fired power station might require 
minimum gas offtake from the gas producer and the minimum offtake from the power 
generation company.  A toll road PPP operator typically assumes the risk on the traffic volume. 
The toll road operator may, in this instance, conduct detailed traffic flow studies and modelling 
to make sure that the project is viable to mitigate demand risks. The Namibia PPP Act advocates 
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for value for money, performance-based payment and risk transfer to the private counterparty. 
The PPP Act will inherently result in the transfer of risk to the private sector.  
 
Table 22: Factor Score and Descriptive Statistics for “Risk Allocation between Private and Public Sector in PPP Projects” 
variable 
Bold value denotes significant factors   
Investment Manager  Pension Funds  





















4.5.2.5 Investment Horizon - Short-termism Investment strategies  
 
Despite differing on the preferred instrument for investment in infrastructure assets, Investment 
Manager and Pension Fund respondents concur that financial instruments’ investment horizon 
(term) or maturity ranges from medium to long-term as shown Table 23. This variable has a 
positive and significant F1 score which confirms the medium to the long term investment 
horizon. A defined benefit fund may take a long term investment view; however, the same 
cannot be assumed of defined contribution funds that make up the majority of the Pension Funds 
in the industry. Most of Pension Funds are relatively small with assets of less than N$ 100 
million thus may prefer to invest in highly liquid assets that have short term maturity.   
 
Table 23: Factor Score and Descriptive Statistics for “Investment horizon of preferred instrument” variable 
Bold value denotes significant factors   
Investment Manager  Pension Funds  
Response % F1  Response % F1  F2  


















Survey respondents provided the following motivation to motivate their response on the 
investment horizon associated with unlisted equities. 
 
Respondent A: “Infrastructure investment has a j-curve and therefore we need to lend over 
long periods of time in order to make the financial model make sense. There is also a strong 
alignment in the return profile of infra assets and pension fund liabilities which means it makes 
more sense to invest over the long-term. There is also no natural market to sell the investment 
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which means that once you have committed capital to the project/asset you are locked in for 
the long-term”  
           
Respondent B: “Infrastructure requires unlisted equity and unlisted long term debt - project 
finance in other words”   
         
Respondent C: “Pension Fund are long term investment”      
 
Infrastructure projects tend to have a net negative cash flow in their initial year of commercial 
operation hence the J-curve as shown in Figure 12. Project finance is typically used to finance 
large scale infrastructure projects via a combination of unlisted debt and equity. Project finance 
debt financing is most often done on a limited or no resource basis which makes it an expensive 
source of finance for infrastructure developers. Project financing is a long term financing to 
improve the viability and competitiveness of infrastructure projects. The above qualitative 
response confirms the descriptive statistics and factor analysis results which shows that “long 
investment term” is an inherent feature of infrastructure investment. According to previous 
studies by Bitsch (2012), Bitsch et al. (2010) and  Inderst & Della Croce ( 2013), there is a 
strong alignment in the return profile of infrastructure asset and Pension Fund liabilities which 
makes them perfect for investment over the long-term. There is no natural market to sell the 
investment which means that, once an investor has committed capital to the project/asset, the 
investor is locked in for the long-term.  
 








Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 Year 7 Year 8 Year 9 Year 10
Cash inflow Cash Outflow Net Cash Position
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4.5.3 Investment too risky 
 
The finding is section 4.5.2.4  confirms that investment in infrastructure is generally risky.  
Table 24 below shows the variables that, according to the respondents, make infrastructure 
investment too risky. Greenfield projects are especially risky as shown in Figure 8 due to 
several factors which amongst others includes construction risk (completion) and credit risk. 
As per factor analysis findings for Investment Manager responses, the following variables have 
a positive and significant F1 score; (i), high construction and patronage risks, (ii) high 
regulatory and political risks, and (iii) unfair risk allocation in Public Private Partnerships. 
Pension Fund respondents attribute riskiness of infrastructure investment to high credit risk and 
a lack of government support; however, high construction and patronage risks do not contribute 
to high investment risks. The findings that “infrastructure investment is too risky” is aligned 
with observations by researchers such as Bitsch et al. ( 2010), Beeferman(2008); Ehlers( 2014); 
Inderst( 2010); Inderst and Della Croce(2013) and Thierie and Moor (2016).  The factors 
attribute for high investment risk are mostly related to greenfield infrastructure development 
which as per findings by Bitsch et al. (2010) have a relatively high-risk exposure as compared 
to brownfield projects.  
 
Table 24: Factor Score and Descriptive Statistics for “factors causing high risk in infrastructure investment/assets” 
variables  
Bold value denotes significant factors   
Investment Manager  Pension Fund   
%  Response F1 % Response F1 F2 
High Construction And Patronage Risk 100% 1,395 46% 0,622 -2,235 
 
 Unfair Risks Allocation In Public 
Private Partnerships 
60% 0,821 31% -0,421 -0,068 
 Lack Of Government Support 
Framework 
40% 0,437 46% 1,099 1,396 
 High Regulatory And  Political Risk 80% 1,138 31% 1,032 1,505 
 High Credit Risks 20% -0,244 38% 1,349 0,263 
 Technology No Mature And Prove In 
Local Context 
0% - 0,560 0% -0,707 0,32 
All Of The Above 0% -0,560 15% -0,707 0,199 
 
4.5.4 Lack of expertise/understanding of infrastructure assets 
 
All Pension Fund respondents acknowledge that they do not have internal resource and 
investment expertise to manage and originate infrastructure investment deals. As confirmed 
with F1 score in Table 23, the lack of expertise amongst Pension Funds is mainly due to the 
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following factors; (i) costly to keep expertise internal and (ii) asset managers can do it better at 
lower costs.  Fifty percent of Investment Manager Respondents do not have internal resources 
and investment expertise as shown in Table 25. The rate of Investment Managers with internal 
expertise is higher than for Pension Funds because managers are actively involved in managing 
Pension Fund assets and the fact that investment services may be sourced from the head office 
where there are economies of scale. The parent companies for most, if not all Investment 
Managers in Namibia reside in South Africa where some head office functions are hosted. As 
a result, Investment Managers in Namibia may not have the required investment expertise 
available locally as these are provided from the head office.   
 
Table 25: Factor Score and Descriptive Statistics for “Internal resources and investment expertise to manage infrastructure 
investment” variable  
Bold value denotes significant factors   
Yes  No  F1  F2  
Investment Manager 50% 50% 0,75  
 
Pension Fund 0% 100% -0,71  ,32  
 
Positive and significant F1 score confirms the view that the Investment Manager have internal 
expertise. Pension funds F1 score for variable such as; (i) costly to keep expertise internal and 
(ii) asset manager can do it better at lower cost are positive and significant meaning they can 
be attributed for lack of internal resources amongst pension fund respondents as shown in Table 
26. The other variables have a negative and significant factor meaning that they do not 
contribute to the lack of internal resources for investing in infrastructure. The lack of internal 
expertise increases investment costs and acts a barrier to pension fund investment into 
infrastructure in support of Inderst & Della Croce (2013) research findings on Australian and 
Canadian Pension Fund Investment in Infrastructure. Inderst & Della Croce (2013) found that 
smaller pension funds are not likely to have internal expertise for pension fund investment 










Table 26: Factor Score and Descriptive Statistics for “Factor attributed to lack of internal resources” variables  
Bold value denotes significant factors   
Investment 
Manager 
Pension Fund  
 
Response % F1  Response % F1  F2  
Costly To Keep Expertise Internal 40% -2,20 46% 1,34 0,18 
 Lack Of Scale To Manage Investments 
Inhouse 
20% -2,39 15% -0,64 0,21 
 Asset Managers Can Do It Better At 
Lower Costs 
0% -2,52 85% 2,39 -1,06 
 Not Enough Infrastructure Investment 
To Warrant Internal Expertise 
20% -2,39 15% -0,55 -0,03 
 
4.5.5 Alignment in Investment Strategies 
 
The majority (53%) of Pension Fund respondents acknowledge that they typically do not offer 
their members choices in terms of the risk-return profile in which their savings are invested. 
All members are therefore exposed to the same risk-return profiles as part of one umbrella 
fund/investment portfolio. The impact of members’ choice on the Pension Fund investment 
strategies concerning investment horizon, liquidity requirement, risk appetite and the scale of 
capital requirement is negligible as shown in Table 27. Most of the respondents indicated low 
or no impact from fund members’ choices on investment strategy aspects as liquidity, risk 
tolerance and capital requirement. Fund members’ choices thus have a negligible impact on 
investment strategies.  F1 and F2 score for all variables except the target investment horizon 
has a negative and significant score meaning that these variables do not have an impact on 
investment strategies. The target investment horizon is naturally long-term due to the long term 
nature of Pension Fund liabilities so the indication according to F1 scores (positive and 
significant) that the impact of member choice of target investment horizon is high may not be 
necessarily true.    
Table 27: Factor Score and Descriptive Statistics for” Impact of Member choice on Pension Fund Investment Strategy” 
variables 
Bold value denotes significant factors   




( 4-6 years) 
Long-term  
( >7 years) 
N/A F1  F2  
Target Investment Horizon 11% 33% 56% 0% 2,001 -0,829 
Liquidity 60% 10% 0% 30% -1,187 -1,982 
Risk Appetite/Tolerance 67% 11% 0% 22% -0,948 -2,301 




4.6 Impact of Pension Fund Regulation on Infrastructure investing 
 
Survey respondents provided the following response about their view on the impact of 
regulation on pension fund investing in infrastructure.  
Respondent A: “Bureaucracy, too slow, NAMFISA over-regulated” 
 
Respondent B: “It is an important consideration. The important thing is that the regulations 
should be consistent and the regulator should be market-friendly in their approach. By "market-
friendly" I mean that they should be open to engagement and be staffed with competent people 
that will look to maximise the utility from these projects for all parties involved - including the 
end consumers” 
 
Respondent C: “Pension Fund Regulation limited to 3.5 for unlisted investments”  
 
Respondent D: “asymmetric return and effort” 
 
Respondent E: “Infrastructure investment is highly risky for pension fund and as a result 
regulation have limited the amount of direct infrastructure investment to 3.5% of Fund which 
can be very low in terms of dollar value for most of the pension funds” 
 
Respondent F: “Incentives are required for infrastructure projects - e.g. the solar power 
purchase agreements” 
 
Respondent G: “Limits how much pension fund can invest in unlisted investment to a 
maximum of 3.5% of the asset under management” 
  
Respondent H: “If regulators want to determine pricing outside the commercial terms, it 
jeopardises the project viability” 
 
Respondent I: “It has a minimum impact as there is no proper regulation on infrastructure 
investment” 
 





Respondent K: “Compromising liquidity and increase portfolio risk over the short term” 
 
Respondent L: “Regulatory restriction on limits” 
 
According to the above narrative, the impact of regulation is most visible in terms of the 
limitations that Regulations 28 and 29 put on Pension Fund investment with Unlisted 
Investment Managers (UIM). Pension Funds are required to invest a minimum of 1.75% and a 
maximum of 3.5% in unlisted investment via unlisted Investment Managers under Regulation 
28.  Infrastructure investment could be very risky for Pension Funds and, as a result, regulations 
place limits on the amount of direct infrastructure investment to 3.5% of the fund which can be 
very low in terms of dollar value for most of the Pension Funds. Most Pension Funds are valued 
at less than N$ 100 million and may not be able to achieve the required scale to be able to invest 
in infrastructure in the absence of financial instruments that allow flexible investment scales, 
especially given the findings in section 4.6, which state that, according to the respondents, the 
required investment scale ranges from moderate to high.  
 
Furthermore, respondent express concerns with excessive regulation and a slow and 
incompetent regulator, which may be negatively impacting Pension Fund investment in 
infrastructure. The regulations may be stringent, however, they do assure investors through the 
creation of a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) that investments are being invested and managed 
prudently. Pension Funds are involved in investment decisions as part of the SPVs (private 
limited company or trusts) that are set up solely to approve and monitor the performance of 













CHAPTER 5: Conclusions and recommendations  
5.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter covers the conclusions of the research findings and analysis within the context of 
the literature review and with the aims of answering the research questions and achieving the 
research objective. The chapter consists of four main sections, namely, (i) the review of factors 
hindering Pension Fund investment in infrastructure; (ii) the section covering Pension Fund 
attitudes towards investment in infrastructure; (iii) Pension Fund regulation; and lastly (iv) 
recommendations for future research. The chapter is structured in such a manner as to provide 
answers to the research question and fulfil the research objective.    
 
5.2 Factors hindering Pension Fund Investment in Infrastructure  
 
The research largely confirmed the finding by (Beeferman, 2008; Della Croce & Yermo, 2013; 
Inderst & Della Croce, 2013), amongst other researchers, who identified the following key 
factors as presenting a challenge to fund investment in infrastructure:  
 
a) The lack of project pipeline is by far the main factor hindering mainly Pension Fund 
investment in infrastructure in conformance with earlier findings by researchers such as 
Beeferman (2008), Eberhard et al., (2014) and Inderst & Della Croce (2013). The lack of a 
project pipeline is caused by a combination of factors, each with a varying level of 
influence. The top factors are, (i), projects are not sufficiently developed therefore they are 
not readily bankable. (ii), public procurement policies and procedures are not fully mature 
and have not been tested for large scale infrastructure projects. Inefficiency in public 
procurement processes and procedures prevent or delay private sector investment in 
economic and social infrastructure assets. Policymakers are recommended to create the 
necessary conditions for Public Procurement and Public Private Partnership policies to gain 
sufficient track records and create confidence amongst investors. Rooting out corruption 
and ensuring processes are transparent and fair to all stakeholders can create investor 
confidence in the two policies. (iii), there is no government support mechanism for large 
scale infrastructure projects. As demonstrated with the upgrade of the Walvis Bay container 
terminal, government guarantees for state-owned entity debt repayment obligations have 
proven crucial in successfully raising financing for projects from the African Development 
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Bank (AfDB) (AfDB, 2013). The Kudu Gas to Power Project, which forms part of the 
national development plans and was meant to ensure the security of supply in Namibia and 
turn the country into a net exporter, is largely stagnating due to the fact the government is 
not in a position to offer monetary and non-monetary guarantees. There are no government 
guarantees envisaged in the PPP framework which would give comfort to private investors 
that infrastructure being developed is needed and enjoys the support of Government. Private 
sector investors are reluctant to invest in large scale public infrastructure projects due to 
lack of government support mechanisms.  
 
 Other factors may include issues such as; (iv) a lack of funding for project preparation and 
feasibility studies, (v) projects that are not viable on their own without government 
subsidies, (vi) unfair risk allocation to the private sector for risks that should naturally be 
assumed by the government, (vii) the implementing agency may lack expertise in project 
preparation and feasibility studies; (viii) and the absence of funding may result in delays in 
the execution of projects. Most institutions tasked with infrastructure development rely on 
own funding sources for project preparation and feasibility studies, which may be limited 
or not available at all. International development financial institutions are slowly availing 
grant funding for use in project preparation or feasibility studies and to continue supporting 
public institutions. The National Planning Commission,( 2017a) has, as part of the NDP5, 
identified detailed projects, especially in the energy, water, railway, port and road 
infrastructure sectors for development; however, these need to be sufficiently developed to 
be bankable. Investors need certainty in terms of the investable opportunities as 
demonstrated with the South Africa REIPPP programme where a large number of IPPs was 
procured over numerous rounds of procurement. Local financial institutions, such as the 
Development Bank of Namibia, need to investigate the provision of project preparation and 
feasibility study funding to increase the pipeline project.  
 
Inderst & Della Croce (2013), in their study on Pension Fund investment in Australia and 
Canada, revealed that integrated, coordinated infrastructure planning across different levels 
of implementing agencies is a necessity to increase the supply of infrastructure projects. 
Implementing agencies are recommended to develop long term infrastructure development 
plans and allocate funding resources to ensure the projects are sufficiently developed and 
bankable. The national development plans (NDPs) already provide detailed plans for the 
development of social and economic infrastructure; however, these need to be coordinated 
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at various levels of government, central government (line ministries), regional and local 
government, and state-owned enterprises tasked with implementing these plans. The 
projects may be developed with in-house resources or external expertise that has a track 
record in the development of similar projects.  
 
The government needs to develop an implementation agreement or a government support 
framework that does not place a burden on the fiscal budget and create a debt burden on the 
government. The implementation agreement creates the same obligation as a standard on-
demand and unconditional guarantee but without the burden created by the contingent 
liabilities and reduced government borrowing capacity. As per the finding by Ehlers, 
(2014), the lack of an infrastructure project pipeline increases the cost of bidding and 
investors and developers incur high costs during the bidding process with no guaranteed 
chances of success and no guarantees of other projects in the pipeline. 
 
b)  Pension Funds lack expertise in infrastructure investment and do not recognise 
infrastructure as a unique asset class. Pension Fund administrators require the necessary 
skills and expertise to manage infrastructure investments in-house as a combination of the 
lack economies of scale and the fact that fund managers can manage infrastructure 
investments more economically, can create more value for Pension Funds and their 
beneficiaries. Internal fund managers may also outsource these functions to group level or 
regional office level. The lack of expertise may also be attributed to the fact that Pension 
Fund administrators mostly rely on external consultants/experts to manage and exercise 
oversight over Investment Managers on their behalf. Pension Funds only focus on higher-
level asset allocation per asset class and performance as part of their investment 
management activities. Inderst & Della Croce (2013) argue that in-house resources are a 
key success factor for infrastructure investing. Pension Funds can, over time, gain 
experience that would enable direct investment in infrastructure projects or allow them to 
originate projects.  
 
c) Available financial instruments (unlisted equity) are highly illiquid and require a long 
term approach which may not match Pension Fund requirements. Mature financial markets, 
such as Canada, Australia and, to some degree, South Africa, offer a full spectrum of 
instruments that match the needs of the Pension Fund as indicated in Figure 8. Available 
financial instruments do not necessarily match the needs of Pension Fund investors across 
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the risk-return spectrum. Financial instruments should cater to the needs of the broad 
spectrum of Pension Funds with relatively low assets, defined benefits or defined 
contributions, short or long investment horizons, varying degrees of risk appetite and 
liquidity requirements. The pool of listed infrastructure assets is limited to a few bonds from 
infrastructure asset operators/developers that are listed on NSX/JSE and the few listed 
equities focusing on ICT and renewable energy. Investment in infrastructure via unlisted 
equity is considered highly risky due to the long term and illiquid nature of the investment. 
Listed infrastructure equity/shares and funds are very limited and will not absorb available 
funding. The lack of depth and financial instruments forces Pension Funds to largely invest 
in government bonds to meet the local asset requirements as per the requirement of 
Regulation 28. Infrastructure developers, financial institutions and regulators need to create 
instruments, such as listed equities or funds that meet Pension Fund requirements 
concerning risk-return, scale and term of investment, and liquidity of the assets. Listed 
funds may be highly liquid and have a lower capital requirement relative to unlisted equities. 
The available listed bonds cannot absorb available funding even if fully drawn down due to 
their limited scale. The financial regulators, NAMFISA and the Bank of Namibia should 
encourage the growth of the local financial sector to increase the number of financial 
instruments available to investors and increase the size of the financial sector to absorb local 
funding capacity. The government is recommended to explore the options of partial listed 
infrastructure SOEs, such as NamPower, NamWater, Road Fund Administrator (RFA), 
NamPort and TransNamib, among others, to facilitate Pension Fund investment into 
infrastructure and reduce transaction costs and risks.  
5.3 Pension Funds attitudes towards investment in infrastructure in Namibia  
 
The attitude of Pension Funds towards investments in infrastructure is largely driven by a lack 
of expertise and, to a large extent, the understanding and acceptance of infrastructure as an asset 
class. The fact that there are very few opportunities to invest in infrastructure assets and limited 
autonomy of Pension Fund trustees and administrators in managing investments, also 
perpetuate the attitudes of Pension Funds towards infrastructure assets. The prevailing attitudes 
can only be reversed with increased Pension Fund investment in infrastructure fostered by a 
combination of an increased project pipeline, financial instruments that match Pension Fund 





The study confirmed the existing hypothesis that Pension Fund investments in local 
infrastructure are relatively low, on average between 2 and 5% of their assets, as compared to 
international Pension Funds which typically invest between 10 and 15% of assets in 
infrastructure. The factors discussed in section 5.2 can be attributed to the low levels of Pension 
Fund investment in infrastructure development. Local infrastructure projects may also be 
competing for investments with international assets which can match investors’ high return 
expectations and low-risk tolerance. 
 
Pension Funds typically invest in infrastructure assets via unlisted Investment Managers in the 
form of equity or debt. UIM’s are required to create a Special Purpose Vehicle on behalf of 
participating investors (Pension Funds) to allow involvement in the governance and investment 
decision-making process. The SPV can be in the form of a “trust” registered with the Masters 
of High Court or a private limited company registered with Business and Intellectual Property 
Authority (BIPA) of Namibia. The SPV allows for more than one participating investor thus is 
a form of collective investment scheme and can partly address the issue of the lack of scale for 
investment in infrastructure, as discussed in section 4.5.2.3. However, the drawbacks of unlisted 
investment, such as being highly illiquid, having high exposure to political and regulatory risks 
and the long investment horizon (term), remains.  
 
5.4 Pension Fund Regulation 
 
Pension Fund Regulation encourages Pension Fund investment in infrastructure via unlisted 
Investment Managers; however, it also restricts the level of investment to a maximum of 3.5% 
of Pension Fund assets. Pension Funds with assets less than N$ 100 million may not have the 
scale to invest in infrastructure assets individually because infrastructure is capital intensive. 
The limits on assets held with UIMs can be relaxed somewhat to facilitate increased investment 
in infrastructure while mitigating risk via governance processes. According to Regulation 29, 
Pension Funds are involved in investment decisions as part of the Special Purpose Vehicles 
(private limited company or trust) that are set up solely to approve and monitor the performance 
of Pension Fund investments/assets. The Minister of Finance, as part of the 2020 mid-term 
budget review, has signalled that the upper limit for unlisted investments will be increased from 
3.5% to 5%, 7.5% and ultimately to 10%, subject to meeting performance criteria (Ministry of 
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Finance, 2019b, 2019a). The increase in upper limits for unlisted investments may address 
concerns regarding the lack of scale and the negative impacts associated with regulation.  
 
5.5 Recommendations for Future Research  
 
This descriptive and exploratory research revealed the factors hindering Pension Fund 
investment in infrastructure; however, it did not necessarily prove causality. The research 
confirmed findings reached in previous studies which are discussed in section 5.3, 5.2, and 5.4. 
It is recommended to focus future research on investigating the lack of a project pipeline in 
greater detail to further contribute and deepen the body of knowledge on infrastructure in the 
Namibian context. Increased Pension Fund (or other institutional investors) investments into 
infrastructure projects could bridge the infrastructure and funding gaps and stimulate the 
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Appendix A1: Questionnaire Pension Fund Investment in Infrastructure 




1. Does the fund fully recognise infrastructure as a unique asset class with distinct 
economic and financial characteristics? * 
Mark only one oval. 
ᴑ Not Sure   ᴑ Yes      ᴑNot sure  
 
2. If Answer to 1 is “Yes", Select financial and economic characteristics that make 
  Infrastructure investment attractive * 
Check all that apply. 
▢Attractive returns 
▢Stable (Low sensitivity to economic cycles) returns 
▢Low Correlation with other asset classes (diversification potential) 
▢Long term stable and predictable returns 
▢Good inflation hedged returns 
▢Low default Rate 
▢High barrier to entry 
▢None of the above 
▢Other:________________________________________________________ 
 
3. If Answer to 1 is “No", Select feature that makes infrastructure unattractive * 
Check all that apply. 
▢Low liquidity 
▢investment too risky 
▢Long investment horizon 
▢Lack of financial instruments 
▢High capital requirement 
▢Other:________________________________________________________ 
4. 
4. What makes infrastructure investment (assets) too risky? 
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Check all that apply. 
▢High construction and patronage risk 
▢Unfair risks allocation in Public Private Partnerships 
▢Lack of government support framework 
▢High regulatory and political risk 
▢High credit risks 
▢Technology no mature and prove in the local context 
▢Other:_______________________________________________________ 
 
5. The Pension Fund has a target allocation to infrastructure assets * 
Mark only one oval  
ᴑ Yes   ᴑ No 
 
6. What is the allocation in Percentage? 
 
7. The fund/asset manager have internal resources and investment expertise to 
Manage infrastructure investment? * 
Mark only one oval. 
ᴑ Yes   ᴑ No 
 
8. If the answer to 7 is No, selected motivation * 
Check all that apply. 
▢ Costly to keep expertise internal 
▢ Lack of scale to manage investments in-house 
▢ Asset managers can do it better at lower costs 
▢ Not enough infrastructure investment to warrant internal expertise 
▢ Other: ___________________________________________________________ 
 
9. Does fund member have a choice in terms of the risk-return profile of their 
portfolios? * 
Mark only one oval. 
78 
 
ᴑ Yes   ᴑ No 
10. What is impact of greater member choice on Investment Horizon * 
Mark only one oval. 
ᴑ Short-term (1-3 years) ᴑ Medium Term (4-6 years) ᴑ Long-term (>7 years) 
Motivate your answer___________________________________________________ 
 
11. What is impact of greater member choice on Liquidity * 
Mark only one oval. 
ᴑ Low    ᴑMedium ᴑHigh 
Motivate your answer___________________________________________________ 
12. What is impact of greater member choice on Risk Appetite/tolerance * 
Mark only one oval. 
ᴑ Low    ᴑMedium ᴑHigh 
Motivate your answer___________________________________________________ 
 
13. What is the impact of greater member choice on Investment capital requirement * 
Mark only one oval. 
ᴑ Low    ᴑMedium ᴑHigh 
Motivate your answer___________________________________________________ 
 
14. Select the instruments used for investments in infrastructure assets * 
Mark only one oval. 
ᴑ Listed Funds ᴑ Listed equities/shares ᴑ Unlisted (private) equity 





15. Does the financial Instrument match the pension fund risk-return expectations? 
Mark only one oval. 
ᴑ Yes   ᴑ No 
16. In relation to Answer in 14), what is the Investment Horizon? * 
Mark only one oval. 
ᴑ Short-term (1-3 years) ᴑ Medium Term (4-6 years) ᴑ Long-term (>7 years) 
Motivate your answer (optional) ___________________________________ 
 
17. In relation to Answer in 14), what is the instrument's Liquidity levels? * 
Mark only one oval. 
ᴑ Low    ᴑMedium ᴑHigh 
 
Motivate your answer (optional) ___________________________________ 
 
18. In relation to Answer in 14), what is the Riskiness of the assets? * 
Mark only one oval. 
ᴑ Low    ᴑMedium ᴑHigh 
 
Motivate your answer (optional) ___________________________________ 
 
19. In relation to Answer in 14), what is the scale of capital investment? * 
Mark only one oval. 
ᴑ Low    ᴑMedium  ᴑHigh 
 
Motivate your answer (optional)___________________________________ 
 
20. In relation to Answer in 14), what is the level of exposure to Regulatory and 
Political risks * 
Mark only one oval. 
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ᴑ Low    ᴑMedium  ᴑHigh 
 
21. Is there a steady stream of bankable infrastructure projects/opportunities * 
Mark only one oval. 
ᴑ Yes   ᴑ No 
22. If the answer to 21 is "No" * 
Check all that apply. 
▢ Projects are not viable on their own 
▢Lack of financial instruments 
▢Infrastructure project not sufficiently development 
▢Lack of expertise in project development 
▢Lack of or ineffective public procurement policies and processes 
▢Lack of or ineffective public private partnership policies 
▢Lack of government support 
▢Lack of infrastructure Development Plan 
▢Unfair risk allocation to private parties in PPP Projects 
▢Other:_____________________________________________________________ 
 
Motivate your answer (optional)__________________________________________ 
 




24. Are there any effective and efficient public procurement policies for infrastructure 
development * 
Mark only one oval. 
ᴑ Yes  ᴑNo 
Motivate your answer _________________________________________________ 
 
25. Are there effective and efficient Public Private Partnership policies for 
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Infrastructure development * 
Mark only one oval. 
ᴑ Yes  ᴑNo 
Motivate your answer _________________________________________________ 
 
26. What is the risk allocation for public private partnership projects? I.e. Demand 
Risk/foreign exchange risk * 
Mark only one oval. 
ᴑ Public 
ᴑ Private 
ᴑ Private Risk Insurance 
Motivate your answer _________________________________________________ 
27. What other factors contribute to low level of investment into infrastructure by 









Appendix A2: Questionnaire Pension Fund Investment in Infrastructure 
(Pension Funds  
 
Pension Fund Investment in Infrastructure 
 
Name of Investment/Asset Manager (Optional)  
_____________________________________ 
Asset (N$) under management  
________________________________ 
1. The fund fully recognise infrastructure as a unique asset class with distinct economic and 
financial characteristics?  
 
Mark only one oval. 
ᴑ Yes ᴑ No ᴑ Not Sure  
2. If Answer to 1 is “Yes", Select financial and economic characteristics that make 
infrastructure investment attractive  
 
Check all that apply. 
Attractive returns  
▢Stable (Low sensitivity to economic cycles) returns  
▢Low Correlation with other asset classes (diversification potential)  
▢Long term stable and predictable returns  
▢Good inflation hedged returns  
▢Low default Rate  
▢High barrier to entry  
▢None of the above  
Other: ________________________________ 
 
3. If Answer to 1 is “No", Select feature that makes infrastructure unattractive  
Check all that apply. 
▢Low liquidity  
▢investment too risky  
▢Long investment horizon  
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▢Lack of financial instruments  
▢High capital requirement  
▢Not applicable  
Other:  
4. What makes infrastructure investment (assets) too risky?  
Check all that apply. 
▢High construction and patronage risk  
▢Unfair risks allocation in Public Private Partnerships  
▢Lack of government support framework  
▢High regulatory and political risk  
▢High credit risks  
▢Technology no mature and prove in the local context  
▢All of the above  
Other: __________________________________________ 
5. The Asset Manager has a target allocation to infrastructure assets  
Mark only one oval. 
ᴑ Yes ᴑ No  
6. What is the allocation in Percentage?  
________________________________ 
7. The fund/asset manager have internal resources and investment expertise to manage 
infrastructure investment?  
Mark only one oval. 
ᴑ Yes ᴑ No  
8. If the answer to 7 is No, selected motivation  
 
Check all that apply. 
▢Costly to keep expertise internal  
▢Lack of scale to manage investments in-house  
▢Asset managers can do it better at lower costs  
▢Not enough infrastructure investment to warrant internal expertise  
Other:  
9. Select the instruments used for investments in infrastructure assets  
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Mark only one oval. 
ᴑ Listed Funds  
ᴑ Listed equities/shares  
ᴑ Unlisted (private) equity  
ᴑ Unlisted Funds  
ᴑ Direct Borrowing (OTC) - debt  
ᴑ Bonds  
ᴑ Other: ________________________ 
10. Does the financial Instrument align with Pension Fund or asset manager investment 
strategy (risk-return?)  
Mark only one oval. 
ᴑ Yes ᴑ No  
11. In relation to Answer in 9), what is the instrument's Investment Horizon?  
 
Mark only one oval. 
ᴑ Short-term (1-3 years) ᴑ Medium Term (4-6 years) ᴑ Long-term (>7 years) 
Motivate your answer  
___________________________________________________________________  
  
12. In relation to Answer in 9), what is the instrument's Liquidity levels?  
Mark only one oval. 
ᴑ Low    ᴑMedium  ᴑHigh 
Motivate your answer ________________________________________________________ 
 
13. In relation to Answer in 9), what is the instrument's Riskiness?  
Mark only one oval. 
85 
 
ᴑ Low    ᴑMedium  ᴑHigh 
Motivate your answer (optional)  
_____________________________________________________________________  
  
14. In relation to Answer in 9), what is the instrument's scale of capital investment?  
 
Mark only one oval. 
ᴑ Low    ᴑMedium  ᴑHigh 
Motivate your answer  
____________________________________________________________________ 
   
15. In relation to Answer in 14, and 16, what is the level of exposure to Regulatory and 
political risks  
Mark only one oval. 
ᴑ Low    ᴑMedium  ᴑHigh 
16. Is there a steady stream of bankable infrastructure projects/opportunities?  
Mark only one oval. 
ᴑ Yes ᴑ No  
17. If the answer to 21 is "No"  
Check all that apply. 
▢Project not viable on their own  
▢Lack of financial instruments  
▢Infrastructure project not sufficiently development  
▢Implementing agencies Lack of expertise in project development  
▢Lack of or ineffective public procurement policies and processes  
▢Lack of or ineffective public private partnership policies  
▢Lack of government support  
▢Lack of infrastructure Development Plan  
▢Unfair risk allocation to private parties in PPP Projects  














19. Are there any effective and efficient public procurement policies for infrastructure 
development?  
Mark only one oval. 
ᴑ Yes ᴑ No  







20. Are there effective and efficient Public Private Partnership policies for infrastructure 
development?  
Mark only one oval. 
ᴑ Yes ᴑ No  
Motivate your answer  
______________________________________________________________________  
  
21 Is there a fair risk allocation between Public and Private Sector in Public Private 




Mark only one oval. 
ᴑ Public/ SOE Sector  
ᴑ Private Sector  
ᴑ Private Risk Insurance  
Other: ____________________________ 










 23. I acknowledge that I am participating in this study of my own free will. I understand that 
I may refuse to participate or stop participating at any time without penalty. If I wish, I will be 
given a copy of this consent form.  
Mark only one oval. 




Appendix B: Registered Investment Managers  
 
Table 28: NAMFISA Registered Investment Companies    
Source: (Government Institution Pension Fund, 2019; NAMFISA, 2019a) 
Number Name of Institutions  GIPF Assets(2018FY) N$  
1 Allan Gray Namibia (Pty) Ltd 6 479 487 000,00 
2 Arysteq Asset Management (Pty) Ltd 
 
3 Ashburton Fund Managers Namibia (Pty) Ltd 
 
4 Bank Windhoek Ltd 
 
5 Capricorn Asset Management (Pty) Ltd 
 
6 Catalyst Investment Managers (Pty) Ltd 817 683 000,00 
7 EAU Rouge Investment Managers (Pty) Ltd 
 
8 MH Prescient Investment Management (Pty) Ltd 
 
9 FFO Securities Namibia (Pty) Ltd 
 
10 Financial Investments Services Namibia (Pty) Ltd 
 
11 First Capital Treasury Solutions (Pty) Ltd 1 227 945 000,00 
12 Investec Asset Management Namibia (Pty) Ltd 13 338 006 000,00 
13 Investment Solutions (Namibia) Ltd 
 
14 JM Busha Capital Namibia (Pty) Ltd 
 
15 Momentum Asset Management (Namibia) (Pty) Ltd 
 
16 Namibia Asset Management Ltd 14 023 688 000,00 
17 Old Mutual Investment Group (Namibia) (Pty) Ltd 8 682 628 000,00 
18 PointBreak Equity (Pty) Ltd 
 
19 Prudential Portfolio Managers Namibia (Pty) Ltd 1 451 173 000,00 
20 Sanlam Investment Management (Namibia) (Pty) Ltd 4 998 827 000,00 
21 Sovereign Asset Management (Pty) Ltd 2 850 175 000,00 
22 Stanlib Namibia (Pty) Ltd 
 
23 Stimulus Private Equity (Pty) Ltd 
 
24 Tulive Capital (Pty) Ltd 
 






Appendix C: Registered Unlisted Investment Managers (UIMs)  
 
Table 29: NAMFISA REGISTERED Unlisted Investment Managers (UIM) 
Source : (NAMFISA, 2019b) 
Registration 
number  
Unlisted Investment Manager Special Purpose 
Vehicle  
Mandates 
4/UIM/01 IJG Capital (Pty) Ltd IJG Frontier Investment 
Fund Ltd 
Private Equity and 
Venture Capital  
14/UIM/02 Stimulus Private Equity (Pty) Limited Stimulus Investment 
Limited 
  
15/UIM/03 TEMO Capital (Pty) Ltd     
15/UIM/04 
 
BFS NamPro Fund Manager (Pty) Ltd The Namibia 
Procurement Fund I and 
II 
Procurement Debt Fund  
15/UIM/05 EOS Capital (Pty) Ltd Allegrow Fund (Pty) Ltd Private Equity  
15/UIM/06 CREO Assets (Pty) Ltd CREO Investment Fund   




Infrastructure and Private 
Equity  
15/UIM/08 Zillion Asset Management (Pty) Ltd Zillion Investment Fund   
15/UIM/09 Hangala Private Equity (Pty) Ltd Hangala Capital Fund 
(Pty) Ltd 
  
15/UIM/10 Capricorn Asset Management (Pty) Ltd     
5/UIM/11 Koningstein Capital (Pty) Ltd Koningstein Capital 
Property Investment Fund  
Property Development 
and Private Equity  
15/UIM/12 Musa Capital Namibia (Pty) Ltd The Namibia Mid-Cap 
Fund 
Private Equity  
15/UIM/13  Ino Harrith Capital (Pty) Ltd Namibia Infrastructure 
Fund 
Infrastructure and Private 
Equity  
15/UIM/14 InterCapital Asset Management (Pty) Ltd     
15/UIM/15 Tulive Private Equity (Pty) Ltd     
15/UIM/16 Old Mutual Alternative Investments 
(Namibia) (Pty) Ltd 
Tunga real Estate Fund 
and Expanded 
Infrastructure Fund  
Property(Retail, 
Residential and affordable 
Housing) and 
Infrastructure services  
15/UIM/17 Baobab Capital (Pty) Ltd Baobab Growth Fund 
(Pty) Ltd 
Venture Capital  
15/UIM/18 Makalani Fund Manager Namibia (Pty) Ltd     
16/UIM/19 Ariya Bridge Capital (Pty) Ltd Ariya Bridge Trust Fund Infrastructure and Private 
Equity  
16/UIM/20 First Capital Asset Management (Pty) Ltd     
17/UIM/21 Capital Growth Asset Management (Pty) 
Ltd 
    
17/UIM/22 Africanrock Capital (Pty) Ltd     











Appendix D: Registered Pension Fund and Friendly Societies   
 
 










25/7/7/67  1 Government Institutions Pension Fund (GIPF) 143300 108 236 247 499,00 
25/7/7/107  2 Retirement For Local Authorities and Utility Services in Namibia  6442 4 505 724 380,00 
25/7/7/489  3 Benchmark Retirement Fund 11336 2 910 021 805,00 
25/7/7/6  4 Unipoly Retirement Fund 2592 2 380 056 000,00 
25/7/7/41  5 Rössing Pension Fund 676 2 164 617 964,80 
25/7/7/301  6 Napotel Pension Fund 1801 1 856 669 134,85 
25/7/7/110  7 Namdeb Employees Provident Fund 2228 1 849 014 785,84 
25/7/7/35  8 Orion Namibia Provident Fund 12691 1 559 711 682,00 
25/7/7/50  9 Nampower Provident Fund 1045 1 312 774 000,00 
25/7/7/360  10 Alexander Forbes Namibia Provident Preservstion Fund 12986 1 266 380 000,00 
25/7/7/337  11 First National Bank Namibia Holdings Retirement  Fund 2286 1 179 758 000,00 
25/7/7/3  12 Ohlthaver and List Retirement Fund 4839 1 176 446 514,72 
25/7/7/206  13 Alexander Forbes Namibia Pension Preservation Fund 8478 1 081 688 000,00 
25/7/7/226  14 Standard Bank Namibia Retirement  Fund 1899 1 019 593 606,00 
25/7/7/38  15 Capricorn Group Retirement Fund 1770 872 439 330,73 
25/7/7/116  16 TransNamib Retirement Fund 1405 730 616 478,10 
25/7/7/89  17 Namwater Pension Fund 636 590 863 441,00 
25/7/7/238  18 Namport Retirement Fund 946 504 280 867,25 
25/7/7/106  19 Air Namibia Retirement Fund 710 458 106 033,96 
25/7/7/303  20 Bidvest Provident Fund( Previously known as Manica Group Namibia Retirement fund) 2115 425 801 954,00 
25/7/7/283  21 Protektor Pension Fund 1936 417 025 679,00 
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25/7/7/18  22 NBC Retirement Fund 462 410 248 139,05 
25/7/7/569  23 FundsAtWork Umbrella Provident Fund (Namibia) 9365 389 545 709,02 
25/7/7/539  24 Sanlam  Staff Umbrella Fund Namibia 609 337 551 384,00 
25/7/7/28  25 Pupkewitz Group Pension Fund 1657 332 096 506,00 
25/7/7/22  26 Nedbank Namibia Pension Fund 762 329 619 945,00 
25/7/7/583  27 MMI Holdings Namibia Staff Pension Funds 831 326 704 686,19 
25/7/7/550  28 Roads Authority Employee Retirement Fund 597 315 504 038,57 
25/7/7/429  29 Walvis Bay Retirement Fund 504 299 532 822,37 
25/7/7/86  30 Bank of Namibia Provident Fund 327 247 623 134,26 
25/7/7/325  31 Skorpion Zinc Provident Fund 712 193 559 253,00 
25/7/7/39  32 Cymot Group Pension Fund 416 182 873 160,00 
25/7/7/516  33 GIPF Employees Pension Fund 244 176 847 713,09 
25/7/7/568  34 FundsAtWork Umbrella Pension Fund (Namibia) 3785 170 463 539,84 
25/7/7/494  35 Member of Parliament and Other Office-Bearers' Pension Fund 579 166 947 785,57 
25/7/7/284  36 Protektor Provident Fund 351 139 928 454,00 
25/7/7/91  37 Metje and Ziegler Pension Fund 447 136 090 936,90 
25/7/7/547  38 NAMFISA Provident Fund 168 129 257 418,00 
25/7/7/483  39 Namibian Independent Schools' Retirement Fund 185 108 430 200,75 
25/7/7/406  40 Agribank Pension Fund 676 2 164 617 965 
25/7/7/57  41 NHE (Nasboukor) Retirement Fund 132 71 472 071,00 
25/7/7/316  42 A &  A Vleis Namibia Voorsorgfonds 
 
  
25/7/7/254  43 Afrox IGL Pension Fund 
  
25/7/7/72  44 AGA Technical Service Provident Fund 
  
25/7/7/4  45 Agra Retirement Fund 
  
25/7/7/424  46 Alexander Forbes Group Namibia Pension Fund 
  
25/7/7/196  47 Alexander Forbes Namibia Retirement Annuity Fund 
  
25/7/7/576  48 Alexander Forbes Namibia Retirement Fund 
  
25/7/7/203  49 Alexander Forbes Namibia Retirement Fund (Pension Section) 
  
25/7/7/202  50 Alexander Forbes Namibia Retirement Fund (Provident Section) 
  




25/7/7/579  52 Alpha Retirement Fund 
  
25/7/7/351  53 Alphine caterers Retirement Fund   
 
25/7/7/287  54 Barloworld (Sonnex) Retirement Fund 
  
25/7/7/177  55 Canyon Hotel Pension Fund   
 
25/7/7/415  56 CIS Retirement Fund   
 
25/7/7/7  57 Coca cola Namibia Bottling Company Retirement Fund(Previously known as Namibia 
Beverage Retirement Fund) 
  
 
25/7/7/199  58 DBC Retirement Fund   
 
25/7/7/220  59 Distell Retirement Fund 
  
25/7/7/48  60 Dutch Reformed Church in Namibia Retirement Fund   
 
25/7/7/131  61 EC Jensen Transport Pension Fund 
  
25/7/7/319  62 Edcon Namibia Retirement Fund 
  
25/7/7/420  63 ELCRN Pension Fund 
  
25/7/7/321  64 Friedels Pension Fund   
 
25/7/7/101  65 Gabus Pension Fund   
 
25/7/7/339  66 Gendev Namibia Retirement Fund   
 
25/7/7/428  67 Gendor Group Pension Fund 
  
25/7/7/32  68 Global Group Pension Fund 
  
25/7/7/417  69 Hospiplan Namibia Pension Fund 
  
25/7/7/5  70 Hotel Safari Retirement Fund 
  
25/7/7/383  71 Intracom Pension Fund 
  
25/7/7/133  72 Karibib Mining and Construction Pension Fund 
  
25/7/7/78  73 KFC Pension Fund 
  
25/7/7/413  74 Lalandii Retirement Fund    
 




25/7/7/142  76 Lever Brother Namibia Pension Fund   
 
25/7/7/277  77 Louis Anderson (Namibia) Pension Fund 
  
25/7/7/452  78 Marina Totoya Ret Fund   
 




25/7/7/272  80 Metal Box ( Namibia ) Pension Fund   
 
25/7/7/114  81 Metropolitan Life Retirement Annuity Fund 25361 
 
25/7/7/334  82 MKU Retirement Fund 
  
25/7/7/481  83 Momentum Namibia Retirement Annuity Fund (previously Swabou Life RA Fund)   
 
25/7/7/390  84 MTC Pension Fund   
 
25/7/7/465  85 Mutual & Federal (Namibia) Retirement Fund 
  
25/7/7/275  86 Namfish Pension Fund   
 
25/7/7/227  87 Namib Mills Retirement Fund 
  
25/7/7/571  88 Namibia Airports Company Provident Fund 
  
25/7/7/178  89 Namibia Blue  Solidate Pension Fund 
  
25/7/7/40  90 Namibia Building Workers' Pension Fund 
  
25/7/7/55  91 Namibia Grape Company Retirement fund 
  
25/7/7/255  92 Namibia Retail (Shoprite) Retirement Fund 
  
25/7/7/466  93 NamQae Pension Fund-Participating in Namflex Pension Fund   
 
25/7/7/555  94 NDC Retirement Fund 
  
25/7/7/161  95 NDC Retirement Fund 
  
25/7/7/147  96 Novanam Group Retirement Fund - 2002 
  
25/7/7/341  97 Old Mutual Namib Retirement Annuity Fund (NARAF) 
  
25/7/7/592  98 Omapungulo Retirement Fund 
  
25/7/7/63  99 Ondunda Pension Fund   
 
25/7/7/83  100 Ondunda Provident Fund 
  
25/7/7/484  101 Oranjemund Spar Pension Fund 
  
25/7/7/36  102 Orion Namibia Pension  Fund 
  
25/7/7/278  103 PDK Pension Fund 
  
25/7/7/113  104 PG Glass Namibia Retirement Fund   
 
25/7/7/407  105 PriceWaterhouseCoopers Retirement Fund   
 
25/7/7/347  106 PRO Con Pension Fund 
  
25/7/7/45  107 Profurn Namibia Retirement Fund   
 
25/7/7/318  108 PW Pampe Retirement Fund 
  




25/7/7/410  110 Sanlam Marketers Retirement Fund in Namibia 
  
25/7/7/361  111 Sanlam Namibia Retirement Annuity Fund 
  
25/7/7/492  112 Sanlam Namibian Personal Portfolios Preservation Pension Fund 
  
25/7/7/491  113 Sanlam Namibian Personal Portfolios Preservation Prov Fund 
  
25/7/7/490  114 Sanlam Namibian Personal Portfolios Retirement Annuity Fund 
  
25/7/7/105  115 Seaflower Namibia Retirement Fund 
  
25/7/7/421  116 Sendingsusters v/d Heiligste Hart v/d Jesus Pension Fund (Missionary Sisters) 
  
25/7/7/188  117 Sentra 307 Pension Fund   
 
25/7/7/204  118 Sentra Namibia Pension Fund 
  
25/7/7/109  119 Solitaire Press Pension Fund 
  
25/7/7/173  120 South West Bakeries Retirement Fund   
 
25/7/7/09  121 Susanne-Grau-Heim Pension Fund 
  
25/7/7/29  122 Swarite Pension Fund 
  
25/7/7/211  123 TM Pension Fund 
  
25/7/7/54  124 Trip Travel Fund 
  
25/7/7/416  125 Typo Retirement Fund 
  
25/7/7/336  126 United Fishing Enterprises Retirement Fund 
  
25/7/7/10  127 Vivo Energy Namibia Retirement Fund 
  
25/7/7/565  128 Walvis Bay Granite Retirement Fund 
  
25/7/7/357  129 WBV Pension Fund 
  
25/7/7/74  130 Wecke & Voigts Retirement Fund 
  
25/7/7/25  131 WEW Pension Fund 
  
25/7/7/8  132 Namcor Pension Fund 97 36 199 176,00 
25/7/7/385  133 Metropolitan Preservation Pension Fund 102 16 752 000,00 
25/7/7/564  134 Ubuntu Retirement Fund(Bonlife Retirement Fund) 729 3 235 315,00 







Appendix E: Summary of survey responses from Investment Managers respondents 
 
Table 31: Summary of survey responses from Investment Managers respondents 
Respondent  A  B C D E  investment 
Managers 
1. Does the fund fully recognise infrastructure as a unique asset class with distinct 
economic and financial characteristics?  
      
Yes √ √ √ √ √ 5 
No 
     
0 
Not Sure 
     
0        
2. If Answer to 1 is “Yes", Select financial and economic characteristics that make infrastructure 
investment attractive  
    





 Stable (Low sensitivity to economic cycles)  returns √ √ 
 
√ √ 4 
 Low Correlation with other asset classes( diversification potential) 
    
√ 1 
 Long term stable and predictable returns √ 
  
√ √ 3 
 Good inflation hedged returns √ √ 
 
√ √ 4 





 High barrier to entry 
 
√ 
   
1 
None of the above 
     
0        
       
3. If Answer to 1 is “No", Select feature that makes infrastructure unattractive  
     
Low liquidity √ 
    
1 
investment too risky 
     
0 
 Long investment horizon 
     
0 
 Lack of financial instruments 
     
0 
 High capital requirement √ 
    
1 
Not applicable 
     
0        
4. What makes infrastructure investment(assets) too risky  
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High construction and patronage risk √ √ √ √ √ 5 
 Unfair risks allocation in Public Private Partnerships 
 
√ √ √ 
 
3 





 High regulatory and  political risk 
 
√ √ √ √ 4 
 High credit risks 
    
√ 1 
 Technology no mature and prove in the local context 
     
0 
All of the Above 
     
0        
High upfront costs -development  risk -  may not get to financial close 
     
0        












     
0        









       
7. The Pension Fund has internal resources and investment expertise to manage 
infrastructure investment?  
      
Yes 
  
√ √ √ 3 
No √ √ 
   
2        
8. If the answer to 7 is No, selected motivation  
      
Costly to keep expertise internal √ √ 
   
2 
 Lack of scale to manage investments inhouse √ 
    
1 
 Asset managers can do it better at lower costs 
     
0 
 Not enough infrastructure investment to warrant internal expertise √ 
    
1        
9. Select the instruments used for investments in infrastructure assets 
      
Listed Funds 





     
0 
Unlisted( private) equity 















     
0 
Other √ 
    
1        
10. Does the financial Instrument align with Pension Fund or asset manager investment 
strategy(risk-return) 
      
Yes √ √ √ √ √ 5 
No 
     
0        
11. In relation to Answer in 9), What is the instrument's Investment Horizon?       
Short-term(1-3 years) 
     
0 













     
0        
12. In relation to Answer in 9) What is the instrument's Liquidity levels?       
Low √ √ √ √ √ 5 
Medium 
     
0 
High  
     
0 
Not applicable 
     
0        
13. In relation to Answer in 9) What is the instrument's Riskiness?       
Low √ 













     
0        













√ √ 3 
Not applicable 
     
0        
15. In relation to Answer in 9) and 13 what is the level of exposure to Regulatory and 
political risks  
      
Low 
     
0 




   
√ √ 2 
Not applicable 
     
0        
16. Is there a steady stream of bankable infrastructure projects/opportunities       
Yes  
    
√ 1 
No √ √ √ √ 
 
4        
17. If the answer to 16 is "No" 
      










 Infrastructure project not sufficiently development √ 
 
√ √ √ 4 
 Implementing agencies Lack of expertise in project development 
  
√ √ √ 3 
 Lack of or ineffective public procurement policies and processes √ √ √ √ √ 5 





 Lack of government support √ √ √ √ 
 
4 





 Unfair risk allocation to private parties in PPP Projects 
 
√ √ √ 
 
3 
 Lack of Project Preparation(feasibility Studies) Funding 
  
√ √ √ 3        
18. Are there any effective and efficient public procurement policies for infrastructure 
development  














2        
19. Are there effective and efficient Public Private Partnership policies for infrastructure 
development  
      
Yes  √ 




√ √ √ 
 
3        
       
20. Is there a Fair risk allocation between Public and Private Sector in Public Private 
Partnership projects? i.e Demand risk 
1 2 2 2 2 
 
Public √ 




√ √ √ √ 4 
Private Risk Insurance 







Appendix F: Summary of survey response from Pension Funds respondents 
 
 
Table 32: Summary of survey response from Pension Funds respondents 
Respondent  A  B C D E F G H I J K L M To
tal 
1. Does the fund fully recognise infrastructure as a unique asset class with 
distinct economic and financial characteristics?  
             
 
Yes √ 


















             
0                
2. If Answer to 1 is “Yes", Select financial and economic characteristics that 
make infrastructure investment attractive  
              
Attractive  returns √ 
     
√ √ 
     
3 
 Stable (Low sensitivity to economic cycles)  returns √ 




 Low Correlation with other asset classes( diversification potential) √ 
     
√ 




 Long term stable and predictable returns √ 
   
√ 




 Good inflation hedged returns √ 




 Low default Rate √ 
            
1 
 High barrier to entry √ 
            
1 
None of the above 
             
0                
               
3. If Answer to 1 is “No", Select feature that makes infrastructure 
unattractive  
              
Low liquidity 
 
√ √ √ √ √ 
  
√ 
   
√ 7 
investment too risky √ 
    
√ 
       
2 
 Long investment horizon 
        
√ 
    
1 
 Lack of financial instruments 
        
√ 
    
1 
 High capital requirement √ √ √ √ 
    
√ 





         
√ 
   
1                
4. What makes infrastructure investment(assets) too risky  
              
High construction and patronage risk 
    





 Unfair risks allocation in Public Private Partnerships 
    
√ 






 Lack of government support framework 
 
√ √ √ 






 High regulatory and  political risk 
 
√ √ √ 




 High credit risks 
 
√ √ √ 
  
√ 
     
√ 5 
 Technology no mature and prove in the local context 
             
0 
All of the Above √ 
        
√ 
   
2                
High upfront costs -development  risk -  may not get to financial close 
             
0  
              
5. The Pension Fund has a target allocation to infrastructure assets  
              
Yes 












             
0                
6. What is the allocation in Percentage 0
% 











               
7. The Pension Fund has internal resources and investment expertise to 
manage infrastructure investment?  
              
Yes 
             
0 
No √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 13                
               
8. If the answer to 7 is No, selected motivation  
              





    
6 
 Lack of scale to manage investments inhouse 
        
√ 
   
√ 2 
 Asset managers can do it better at lower costs √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
  
√ √ √ 11 
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 Not enough infrastructure investment to warrant internal expertise 
    
√ 
    
√ 
   
2                
9. Do Pension Fund members have a choice in term of the risk level in which 
their savings are invested? 
              
Yes 
 
√ √ √ √ 
  
√ 
   
√ √ 7 
No √ 
    
√ √ 
 
√ √ √ 
  
6                
10. If Answer to 9) is Yes, What is the impact on Pension Fund's  target 
Investment Horizon 
              
Short-term(1-3 years) 
            
√ 1 
Medium Term( 4-6 years) 
             
0 
Long-term ( >7 years) 








Not applicable √ √ √ √ 
         
4                
11. If Answer to 9) is Yes, What is impact Pension Fund's Liquidity               
Low 
 
√ √ √ √ 
  
√ 





            
√ 1 
High  
             
0 
Not applicable √ 
        
√ √ 
  
3                
12. If Answer to 9) is Yes, What is the impact on Pension Fund Risk 
Appetite/tolerance 
              
Low 
 
√ √ √ 
   
√ 
   
√ √ 6 
Medium 
         
√ 
   
1 
High  
             
0 
Not applicable √ 
   
√ 
        
2                
13. If Answer to 9) is Yes, What is the impact on the Pension Fund scale of 
capital Investment  
              
Low 
 
√ √ √ 
         
3 
Medium 
       
√ 
     
1 
High 
           
√ √ 2 
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Not applicable √ 
   
√ 
        
2                
14. Select the instruments used for investments in infrastructure assets 
              
Listed Funds 
             
0 
Listed equities/shares 
             
0 
Unlisted( private) equity √ √ √ √ 
 






    
√ 




Direct Borrowing( OTC) - debt 
             
0 
Bonds 
            
√ 1 
Other 
             
0                
15. Does the financial Instrument align with Pension Fund or asset manager 
investment strategy(risk-return) 
              
Yes √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
 
√ √ √ 12 
No 
         
√ 
   
1                
16. In relation to Answer in 14), What is the instrument's Investment 
Horizon? 
              
Short-term(1-3 years) 
             
0 
Medium Term( 4-6 years) √ 
   
√ 
    
√ 
   
3 
Long-term ( >7 years) 
 
√ √ √ 
 
√ √ √ √ 
 
√ √ √ 10 
Not applicable 
             
0                
17. In relation to Answer in 14), What is the instrument's Liquidity levels?               

















             
0 
Not applicable 
             
0                
18. In relation to Answer in 14), What is the instrument's Riskiness?               
Low 
      
√ 
    














√ √ √ √ 
   
√ 
    
5 
Not applicable 
             
0                
19. In relation to Answer in 14), What is the instrument's scale of capital 
investment? 
              
Low 
    
√ √ √ 
 
√ 
    
4 
Medium √ √ √ √ 
     
√ 
   
5 
High 
       
√ 
  
√ √ √ 4 
Not applicable 
             
0                
20. In relation to Answer in 14), and 16), what is the level of exposure to 
Regulatory and political risks  
              
Low 
     
√ √ 





   
√ 
  
√ √ √ 




√ √ √ 
        
√ 4 
Not applicable 
             
0                
21. Is there a steady stream of bankable infrastructure 
projects/opportunities 
              
Yes  










√ √ 10                
22. If the answer to 21 is "No" 
              
 The project not viable on their own √ 
            
1 
 Lack of financial instruments √ 
       
√ 
   
√ 3 
 Infrastructure project not sufficiently development √ 




    
√ 4 
 Implementing agencies Lack of expertise in project development √ 
       
√ 
    
2 
 Lack of or ineffective public procurement policies and processes √ 
    
√ 
      
√ 3 
 Lack of or ineffective public private partnership policies √ √ √ √ 
        
√ 5 
 Lack of government support 
 
√ √ √ 




 Lack of infrastructure Development Plan √ √ √ √ √ 






 Unfair risk allocation to private parties in PPP Projects √ 
            
1 
 Lack of Project Preparation(feasibility Studies) Funding √ 
           
√ 2                
24. Are there any effective and efficient public procurement policies for 
infrastructure development  
              
Yes 




No √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
  
√ 11                
25. Are there effective and efficient Public Private Partnership policies for 
infrastructure development  
              
Yes  
 
√ √ √ √ 
    
√ √ √ √ 8 
No √ 
    
√ √ √ √ 
    
5                
               
26. Is there a Fair risk allocation between Public and Private Sector in 
Public Private Partnership projects? i.e Demand risk 
              
Public 













Private Risk Insurance 
    
√ 
















Appendix G: Investment Manager Response Coded Data 
 
Table 33: Investment Manager Response Coded Data 
Respondents  A B C D E 
1. Does the fund fully recognise infrastructure as a unique asset class with distinct 
economic and financial characteristics?  
4 4 4 4 4 
2. If Answer to 1 is “Yes", Select financial and economic characteristics that make 
infrastructure investment attractive  
     
2.1 Attractive  returns 2 2 4 4 2 
2.2 Stable (Low sensitivity to economic cycles)  returns 4 4 2 4 4 
 2.3 Low Correlation with other asset classes( diversification potential) 2 2 2 2 4 
 2.4 Long term stable and predictable returns 4 2 2 4 4 
 2.5 Good inflation hedged returns 4 4 2 4 4 
 2.6 Low default Rate 4 2 4 2 2 
 2.7 High barrier to entry 2 4 2 2 2 
2. 8 None of the above 2 2 2 2 2 
3. If Answer to 1 is “No", Select feature that makes infrastructure unattractive  
     
3.1 Low liquidity 4 2 2 2 2 
3.2 investment too risky 2 2 2 2 2 
3.3 Long investment horizon 2 2 2 2 2 
3.4 Lack of financial instruments 2 2 2 2 2 
3.5 High capital requirement 4 2 2 2 2 
3.6 Not applicable 2 2 2 2 2 
4. What makes infrastructure investment(assets) too risky  
     
4.1 High construction and patronage risk 4 4 4 4 4 
4.2 Unfair risks allocation in Public Private Partnerships 2 4 4 4 2 
4.3 Lack of government support framework 2 2 4 4 2 
4.4 High regulatory and  political risk 2 4 4 4 4 
4.5 High credit risks 2 2 2 2 4 
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4.6 Technology no mature and prove in the local context 2 2 2 2 2 
4.7 All of the Above 2 2 2 2 2 
5. The Pension Fund has a target allocation to infrastructure assets  4 2 4 4 2 
7. The Pension Fund has internal resources and investment expertise to manage 
infrastructure investment?  
2 2 4 4 4 
8. If the answer to 7 is No, selected motivation  
     
8.1 Costly to keep expertise internal 1 1 0 0 0 
8.2 Lack of scale to manage investments in-house 1 0 0 0 0 
8.3 Asset managers can do it better at lower costs 0 0 0 0 0 
8.4 Not enough infrastructure investment to warrant internal expertise 1 0 0 0 0 
9. Select the instruments used for investments in infrastructure assets 
     
9.1 Listed Funds 2 2 2 2 2 
9.2 Listed equities/shares 2 2 2 2 2 
9.3 Unlisted( private) equity 2 2 2 4 2 
9.4 Unlisted Funds 2 2 4 2 2 
9.5 Direct Borrowing( OTC) - debt 2 4 2 2 4 
9.6 Bonds 2 2 2 2 2 
9.7 Other 4 2 2 2 2 
10. Does the financial Instrument align with Pension Fund or asset manager 
investment strategy(risk-return) 
4 4 4 4 4 
11. In relation to Answer in 9), What is the instrument's Investment Horizon? 3 2 3 2 3 
12. In relation to Answer in 9) What is the instrument's Liquidity levels? 1 1 1 1 1 
13. In relation to Answer in 9) What is the instrument's Riskiness? 1 2 2 3 2 
14. In relation to Answer in 9), What is the instrument's scale of capital investment? 3 2 2 3 3 
15. In relation to Answer in 9) and 13 what is the level of exposure to Regulatory and 
political risks  
2 2 2 3 3 
16. Is there a steady stream of bankable infrastructure projects/opportunities 2 2 2 2 4 
17. If the answer to 16 is "No" 
     
 17.1 Project not viable on their own 4 2 4 4 2 
 17.2 Lack of financial instruments 2 2 4 4 2 
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17.3  Infrastructure project not sufficiently development 4 2 4 4 4 
 17.4 Implementing agencies Lack of expertise in project development 2 2 4 4 4 
 17.5 Lack or ineffective public procurement policies and processes 4 4 4 4 4 
 17.6 Lack or ineffective public private partnership policies 2 2 4 4 2 
17.7 Lack of government support 4 4 4 4 2 
 17.8 Lack of infrastructure Development Plan 2 2 4 4 2 
 17.9 Unfair risk allocation to private parties in PPP Projects 2 4 4 4 2 
 17.10 Lack of Project Preparation(feasibility Studies) Funding 2 2 4 4 4 
18. Are there any effective and efficient public procurement policies for infrastructure 
development  
4 2 4 2 4 
19. Are there effective and efficient Public Private Partnership policies for 
infrastructure development  
4 2 2 2 4 
20. Is there a Fair risk allocation between Public and Private Sector in Public Private 
Partnership projects? i.e Demand risk 




















Appendix H: Pension Fund survey response Likert Coded Data  
 
Table 34: Pension Fund survey response Likert Coded Data 
Respondent A  B C D E F G H I J K L M 
1. Does the fund fully recognise infrastructure 
as a unique asset class with distinct economic 
and financial characteristics?  
4 2 2 2 4 2 4 4 2 2 4 4 2 
2. If Answer to 1 is “Yes", Select financial and 
economic characteristics that make 
infrastructure investment attractive  
             
2.1 Attractive  returns 4 2 2 2 2 2 4 4 2 2 2 2 2 
2.2 Stable (Low sensitivity to economic cycles)  
returns 
4 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 4 4 2 
 2.3 Low Correlation with other asset classes( 
diversification potential) 
4 2 2 2 2 2 4 2 2 2 4 2 2 
 2.4 Long term stable and predictable returns 4 2 2 2 4 2 2 2 2 2 4 2 2 
 2.5 Good inflation hedged returns 4 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 4 2 2 
 2.6 Low default Rate 4 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
 2.7 High barrier to entry 4 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
2. 8 None of the above 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
3. If Answer to 1 is “No", Select feature that 
makes infrastructure unattractive  
             
3.1 Low liquidity 2 4 4 4 4 4 2 2 4 2 2 2 4 
3.2 investment too risky 4 2 2 2 2 4 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
 3.3 Long investment horizon 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 4 2 2 2 2 
 3.4 Lack of financial instruments 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 4 2 2 2 2 
 3.5 High capital requirement 4 4 4 4 2 2 2 2 4 2 2 2 2 
3. 6 Not applicable 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 4 2 2 2 
4. What makes infrastructure investment(assets) 
too risky  
             
4.1 High construction and patronage risk 2 2 2 2 4 4 4 4 4 2 2 4 2 
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4.2 Unfair risks allocation in Public Private 
Partnerships 
2 2 2 2 4 2 2 2 4 2 4 2 4 
 4.3 Lack of government support framework 2 4 4 4 2 2 2 2 4 2 4 2 4 
 4.4 High regulatory and  political risk 2 4 4 4 2 2 2 2 2 2 4 2 2 
 4.5 High credit risks 2 4 4 4 2 2 4 2 2 2 2 2 4 
4.6  Technology no mature and prove in local 
context 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
4.7 All of the Above 4 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 4 2 2 2 
5. The Pension Fund has a target allocation to 
infrastructure assets  
2 2 2 2 2 2 4 4 2 2 4 4 2 
7. The Pension Fund have internal resources 
and investment expertise to manage 
infrastructure investment?  
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
8. If the answer to 7 is No, selected motivation  
             
8.1 Costly to keep expertise internal 4 4 4 4 2 2 4 2 4 2 2 2 2 
8.2 Lack of scale to manage investments 
inhouse 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 4 2 2 2 4 
8.3 Asset managers can do it better at lower 
costs 
4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 2 2 4 4 4 
8.4 Not enough infrastruture investment to 
warrant internal expertise 
2 2 2 2 4 2 2 2 2 4 2 2 2 
9. Do Pension Fund members have a choice in 
term of the risk level in which their savings are 
invested? 
2 4 4 4 4 2 2 4 2 2 2 4 4 
10. If Answer to 9) is Yes, What is impact on 
Pension Fund's  target Investment Horizon 
4 4 4 4 3 4 4 3 4 4 4 3 1 
11. If Answer to 9) is Yes, What is impact 
Pension Fund's Liquidity 
4 1 1 1 1 4 4 1 4 4 4 1 2 
12.If Answer to 9) is Yes, What is impact on 
Pension Fund Risk Appetite/tolerance 
4 1 1 1 4 4 4 1 4 2 4 1 1 
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13. If Answer to 9) is Yes, What is impact on 
Pension Fund scale of capital Investment  
4 1 1 1 4 4 4 2 4 4 4 3 3 
14. Select the instruments used for investments 
in infrastructure assets 
             
14.1 Listed Funds 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
14.2 Listed equities/shares 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
14.3 Unlisted( private) equity 4 4 4 4 2 4 4 4 4 4 2 4 2 
14.4 Unlisted Funds 2 2 2 2 4 2 2 2 2 2 4 2 2 
14.5 Direct Borrowing( OTC) - debt 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
14. 6 Bonds 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 4 
14.7 Other 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
15. Does the financial Instrument align with 
Pension Fund or asset manager investment 
strategy(risk-return) 
4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 2 4 4 4 
16. In relation to Answer in 14), What is the 
instrument's Investment Horizon? 
2 3 3 3 2 3 3 3 3 2 3 3 3 
17. In relation to Answer in 14), What is the 
instrument's Liquidity levels? 
1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 2 2 1 
18. In relation to Answer in 14), What is the 
instrument's Riskiness? 
2 3 3 3 3 2 1 2 3 2 2 1 1 
19. In relation to Answer in 14), What is the 
instrument's scale of capital investment? 
2 2 2 2 1 1 1 3 1 2 3 3 3 
20. In relation to Answer in 14) and 16), what is 
the level of exposure to Regulatory and political 
risks  
2 3 3 3 2 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 3 
21. Is there a steady stream of bankable 
infrastructure projects/opportunities 
2 2 2 2 2 2 4 2 2 4 4 2 2 
22. If the answer to 21 is "No" 
             
 22.1 Project not viable on their own 4 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
 22.2 Lack of financial instruments 4 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 4 2 2 2 4 
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22.3  Infrastructure project not sufficiently 
development 
4 2 2 2 4 2 2 4 2 2 2 2 4 
 22.4 Implementing agencies Lack of expertise 
in project development 
4 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 4 2 2 2 2 
 22.5 Lack or ineffective public procurement 
policies and processes 
4 2 2 2 2 4 2 2 2 2 2 2 4 
 22.6 Lack or ineffective public private 
partnership policies 
4 4 4 4 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 4 
22.7 Lack of government support 2 4 4 4 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
 22.8 Lack of infrastructure Development Plan 4 4 4 4 4 2 2 2 4 2 2 4 2 
 22.9 Unfair risk allocation to private parties in 
PPP Projects 
4 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
 22.10 Lack of Project Preparation(feasibility 
Studies) Funding 
4 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 4 
24. Are there any effective and efficient public 
procurement policies for infrastructure 
development  
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 4 4 2 
25. Are there effective and efficient Public 
Private Partnership policies for infrastructure 
development  
2 4 4 4 4 2 2 2 2 4 4 4 4 
26. Is there a Fair risk allocation between Public 
and Private Sector in Public Private Partnership 
projects? i.e Demand risk 
2 2 2 2 2 4 2 2 4 2 4 4 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
